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Rick Su* 
ABSTRACT 
In debates about the role of federalism in America, much turns on the differences between states.  
But what about divisions within states?  The site of political conflict in America is shifting: battles 
once marked by interstate conflict at the national level are increasingly reflected in intrastate 
clashes at the local.  This shift has not undermined the role of federalism in American politics, as 
many predicted.  Rather, federalism's role has evolved to encompass the growing divide within 
states and between localities.  In other words, federalism disputes—formally structured as between 
the federal government and the states—are increasingly being used to negotiate intrastate conflicts.  
This article describes how and why this transformation has taken place.  Foregrounding this 
development shines light on the local roots of many of the most sensational federalism disputes in 
recent years—from immigration to drug policy.  It also explains why, contrary to traditional 
models, federalism battles frequently involve states that are fiercely divided and undergoing 
political change. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Federalism in America is organized around the relationship be-
tween the federal government and the several states.  Yet we cannot 
truly understand federalism without accounting for the divide within 
states.  Consider the following examples: 
In 2010, the federal government sued Arizona, arguing that its 
immigration enforcement law, S.B. 1070, infringed upon the federal 
government’s power over immigration.1  Arizona stood firm in its op-
position to the federal government.  Cities and other local govern-
ments within Arizona, however, were fiercely divided.  While Mari-
copa County backed the state, cities like Phoenix, Tucson, and 
Flagstaff stood behind the federal government.2  Indeed, long-
standing conflicts between Arizona localities contributed not only to 
 
 1 See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2497 (2012). 
 2 See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of the Arizona Cities of Flagstaff, Tolleson, San Luis, and 
Somerton in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee, United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (No. 10-16645), 2011 WL 5162523; Amicus Curiae Brief Submitted by the City 
of Tucson in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee, United States v. Arizona, 614 F.3d 339 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (No. 10-16645), 2010 WL 5162523; Brief of Joseph M. Arpaio, Maricopa Coun-
ty Sheriff as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 
2492 (2012) (No. 11-182), 2012 WL 506642. 
Oct. 2016] INTRASTATE FEDERALISM 193 
 
the enactment of S.B. 1070, but also to the federal government’s de-
cision to challenge it in court.3 
In 1996, California became the first state to decriminalize medical 
marijuana, placing it at odds with federal law, which categorically 
prohibits its use.4  This laid the groundwork for a federal-state show-
down.  But thus far, the federalism controversy appears to be playing 
out mostly within the state itself.  While cities like Oakland and San 
Francisco invoked state law to resist federal enforcement efforts in 
their communities,5 others like San Diego, Riverside, and Garden 
Grove actively worked with federal authorities and invoked federal 
preemption to defend their efforts to restrict marijuana.6 
In 1990, the Supreme Court issued a landmark decision in New 
York v. United States, holding that the federal government cannot 
“commandeer” states by requiring them to dispose of low-level radio-
active waste produced within their borders.7  A decade earlier, how-
ever, New York was part of the coalition of states that designed the 
federal law it was now challenging.8  What changed was the fierce op-
position that New York faced when it tried to place the waste disposal 
facilities in Allegany and Cortland counties—rural communities that 
had long felt disconnected from the state.9  Indeed the architects of 
the lawsuit were the counties themselves, whose initial complaint was 
that they were being “commandeer[ed]” by the state.10 
 
 3 See infra notes 86–96. 
 4 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 5–6 (2005) (noting that the challenged California state 
law was in conflict with federal law). 
 5 See Lee Romney, Bay Area Cities Battle U.S. in Bid to Save Marijuana Dispensaries, L.A. TIMES 
(July 3, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/print/2013/jul/03/local/la-me-ln-bay-area-
pot-dispensaries-20130703 (discussing local efforts to defend against enforcement of fed-
eral marijuana prohibitions); see also Frances Dinkelspiel, Officials Oppose Feds’ Suit to Shut 
Pot Dispensary, BERKELEYSIDE (May 8, 2013), http://www.berkeleyside.com/2013/05/08/
officials-oppose-federal-suit-to-shut-berkeley-cannabis-dispensary/. 
 6 See David G. Savage, Supreme Court Action Upholds California’s Medical Pot Law, L.A. TIMES 
(May 19, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/print/2009/may/19/nation/na-court-
marijuana19 (reporting on local efforts to enforce the federal ban on marijuana); see also 
Wes Woods, Medical Marijuana and States Rights: Pot Dispensary Owner Faces 10 Years in Jail 
for Violating Federal Laws, INLAND VALLEY DAILY BULL. (Nov. 17, 2012), 
http://www.sbsun.com/health/20121117/medical-marijuana-and-states-rights-pot-
dispensary-owner-faces-10-years-in-jail-for-violating-federal-laws. 
 7 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992). 
 8 See DANIEL J. SHERMAN, NOT HERE, NOT THERE, NOT ANYWHERE: POLITICS, SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS, AND THE DISPOSAL OF LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE, 154–155 (2011) (dis-
cussing the impact of local opposition to the disposal of radioactive waste and the eventu-
al challenge to the law in New York v. United States). 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. at 169. 
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Federalism in the United States is structured around competition 
between the federal government and the states.  But many federalism 
disputes are the product of intrastate conflicts at the local level.  
Competing localities spur federalism disputes by recruiting the feder-
al government and the states to fight on their behalf.  They invoke 
federalism to defend local policies from state or federal intervention.  
They challenge the design of state and federal programs on federal-
ism grounds to advance their interests vis-à-vis those of their neigh-
bors.  Growing intrastate divides mean that a major site of political 
conflict today is within states and between localities.  Federalism, 
however, is increasingly the framework through which these disputes 
are resolved.  The point here is not just that federalism disputes di-
vide states, with some local actors favoring the federal position while 
others preferring that of the state.  Rather, it is that intrastate con-
flicts are often the reason why many federalism disputes break out in 
the first place. 
I refer to this development as “intrastate federalism,” and I argue 
that it is reshaping the role of federalism in American politics.  At the 
most basic level, intrastate federalism provides an alternative account 
of why federalism disputes arise.  Expanding the scope beyond the 
“tug-of-war” between federal power and state rights,11 I show that local 
political cleavages within states provide an alternative explanation for 
why many states get embroiled in battles with the federal govern-
ment.  Indeed, contrary to traditional models of federalism, I argue 
that federalism disputes frequently involve states that are fiercely di-
vided and experiencing tremendous amounts of political change.  
Evaluating federalism from the ground up reveals the local roots of 
many of America’s most sensational federalism battles—roots that are 
often obscured when federal-state alignment of federalism disputes is 
taken at face value.  This approach also highlights the political incen-
tives that lead so many intrastate conflicts to become federalism dis-
putes.  In short, I show that there is a political logic behind why fed-
eralism concerns continue to dominate even as the divide within 
states is starting to overshadow the divide between states. 
Intrastate federalism is not only a useful framework for assessing 
the nature and origins of federalism disputes today.  It also offers a 
unique lens on the history of American federalism.  If the conven-
tional account centers on the shifting balance of federal and state 
 
 11 See ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN 1 (2011) (exploring the theoret-
ical conflict between federal and state power throughout American history and examin-
ing alternative models of federalism in light of contemporary political issues). 
Oct. 2016] INTRASTATE FEDERALISM 195 
 
power throughout American history,12 I show how this balance has 
long been mediated through federal and state relationships with lo-
calities.  The dominance of states in the nineteenth century came 
about through developments in American law that enabled states to 
consolidate their power over cities, towns, and other local govern-
ments within their territories.  When the federal government over-
took states in the twentieth century, it did so in part by forging feder-
al-local relationships that explicitly bypassed the states.  The history of 
these cross-cutting relationships offers further explanations for why 
intrastate conflicts today are increasingly channeled into the federal-
ism arena.  It also casts light on the often neglected role of localities 
in the development of American federalism more generally. 
All of this, I suggest, offers a new perspective on some of the most 
contentious debates in the federalism literature.  For decades, feder-
alism scholars have clashed over the purpose of federalism in Ameri-
can politics.  Is federalism necessary to accommodate distinctive states 
and the fractured political identities they generate among the Ameri-
can people?13  Or are federalism disputes simply the product of na-
tional partisan competition that spills over into state politics?14  Intra-
state federalism suggests that we need not arrive at a coherent or 
cohesive account of states as a socio-economic community to believe 
that federalism continues to be used to negotiate the spatial rifts in 
American society.  At the same time, intrastate federalism reminds us 
that the national partisan divide is in many ways a reflection of geo-
graphic divisions at the local level—between cities and suburbs, ur-
ban and rural, one community from the next.  This may not be the 
 
 12 See, e.g., DAVID BRADSTREET WALKER, THE REBIRTH OF FEDERALISM: SLOUCHING TOWARD 
WASHINGTON 39–174 (1995); LARRY N. GERSTON, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A CONCISE 
INTRODUCTION 54–62 (2007). 
 13 See, e.g., DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES 14–25, 109–12 
(2d ed. 1972) (measuring and analyzing intrastate political cohesion and deviation from 
national trends from state to state); Ernest A. Young, The Volk of New Jersey?  State Identity, 
Distinctiveness, and Political Culture in the American Federal System,  SSRN ELECTRON. J. 1, 44–
45 (2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2552866 (analyzing the academic discussion of the 
“death of state identity”). 
 14 See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1079 (2014) 
(arguing that national partisan competition explains why states get embroiled in federal-
ism battles with the federal government); James A. Gardner, The Myth of State Autonomy: 
Federalism, Political Parties, and the National Colonization of State Politics, 29 J. LAW POLIT. 1, 1 
(2013) (observing that the development of national political parties created a two-way 
street where states can influence national politics, and national politics impacts state poli-
tics); see generally Larry D Kramer, Putting The Politics Back Into The Political Safeguards Of 
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215–93 (2000) (examining the Founders’ belief that state 
power would be protected through the political process, the development of national po-
litical parties, and the modern Supreme Court’s federalism jurisprudence). 
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original intent of federalism as a legal or political framework.  Nor is 
it clear that federalism is a particularly apt framework for this kind of 
intrastate negotiation.  Yet if we are to understand the role and na-
ture of federalism disputes today, it is important that we recognize 
the scale at which America is fractured, and the nature of that divide. 
This article proceeds in four Parts.  Part I sets out the theory of in-
trastate federalism, which I use to explain why intrastate conflicts so 
often underlie federalism controversies.  Part II provides a historical 
account of the development of federal and state power, in which I 
show that localities and intrastate conflicts played an important part.  
Part III examines contemporary federalism theories in light of the 
model that I have outlined.  This is followed in Part IV with consider-
ation of how federalism is shaping the very intrastate divides that it is 
now being called upon to negotiate. 
I.  THE INTRASTATE DIMENSIONS OF FEDERALISM DISPUTES 
Federalism disputes serve many purposes in American politics. 
One such purpose, I argue, is as a means of negotiating intrastate 
conflicts.  As political divides within states grow, the front lines of 
controversial policy disputes are increasingly at the local level.  But 
because of the structure of our federal system, local political actors 
often steer intrastate conflicts into the federalism arena.  From this 
perspective, federalism is about more than the federal-state relation-
ship around which it is legally framed.  Instead, I argue, federalism’s 
role in American politics is defined in part by the internal conflicts 
within the states themselves. 
The use of federalism in this manner is not new or novel.  Indeed, 
intrastate conflicts underlie some of the most sensational federalism 
disputes in recent decades.  Federal-state showdowns over civil rights 
in the 1960s and immigration regulations in the 2010s both had roots 
in contentious intrastate struggles, in which competing local forces 
sought the assistance of the federal government and the state.  Fed-
eralism concerns surrounding the recent federal-state divide over 
marijuana are also being raised by local political actors, who strategi-
cally invoke competing federalism claims to defend local policies.  In-
trastate conflicts have also contributed to federalism controversies 
over the design of federal programs, from those pertaining to the 
disposal of low-level radioactive waste to the use of federal block 
grants in President Ronald Reagan’s “New Federalism” initiatives. 
In other words, federalism disputes often have intrastate conflicts 
at their core.  This Part advances a theory, which I call “intrastate fed-
eralism,” to explain why.  My theory is based on two observations 
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about the structure of the federal system.  The first is that states are 
internally divided and institutionally fragmented.  As a result, the site 
of political conflict is often at the local level and within states.  The 
second is that federalism remains the dominant framework for politi-
cal controversies.  What this means is that local political actors often 
compete to navigate policy disputes into the federalism arena.  Taken 
together, these two aspects of the federal system offer an explanation 
of why federalism is increasingly involved in negotiating intrastate 
conflicts. 
A.  Politics of Divided States 
New York is a liberal hotbed, except of course for the large swath 
of territory that lies “upstate.”15  Texas is a conservative stronghold, 
unless of course you happen to live in the metropolitan regions of 
Austin, Houston, Dallas, or San Antonio.16  Virginia, once the capital 
of the Confederacy, now finds itself internally divided between north 
and south—the former having become a part of the sprawl that is 
metropolitan Washington, D.C.17  Then there is California, which in-
cludes not only some of the most liberal cities in the country, but also 
some of the most conservative.18 
Federalism is historically rooted in the distinctiveness of the sever-
al states.19  Yet there is considerable doubt that state distinctiveness 
plays much of a role in federalism disputes today.20  After all, the divi-
 
 15 See, e.g., EDWARD V. SCHNEIER, JOHN BRIAN MURTAUGH & ANTOINETTE POLE, NEW YORK 
POLITICS: A TALE OF TWO STATES 65–66 (2d ed. 2010) (detailing the connection between 
geography and political party support in the state of New York). 
 16 See Josh Kron, Red State, Blue City: How the Urban-Rural Divide is Splitting America, THE 
ATLANTIC (Nov. 30, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/11/red-
state-blue-city-how-the-urban-rural-divide-is-splitting-america/265686/ (noting differences 
between political party affiliation in urban and rural areas of Texas); Richard Parker, Will 
Cities Turn Texas Purple?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
10/06/opinion/will-cities-turn-texas-purple.html?_r=0 (detailing the realignment from 
conservative to liberal politics in the large, urban areas of Texas). 
 17 See LILIOKANAIO PEASLEE & NICHOLAS J. SWARTZ, VIRGINIA GOVERNMENT: INSTITUTIONS 
AND POLICY 125 (2014) (discussing the cultural divide between northern and southern 
Virginia). 
 18 See Chris Tausanovitch & Christopher Warshaw, Representation in Municipal Government, 
108 AM. POLIT. SCI. REV. 605, 609 (2014) (placing large U.S. cities on a spectrum 
according to conservative policy preference and ranking San Francisco the least 
conservative while finding Anaheim, California, among the top ten most conservative). 
 19 See ELAZAR, supra note 13; cf. generally MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: 
POLITICAL IDENTITY AND TRAGIC COMPROMISE (2009) (discussing the ways in which geo-
graphical differences often create distinct identities among people). 
 20 See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 19, 115–16 (2009) (contesting geographic distinctiveness 
as a basis for federalism in contemporary America). 
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sions between states are fading—eroded by decades of interstate mo-
bility, growing economic integration, and the emergence of a nation-
al culture.21  Moreover, given the dominance of the two-party system 
and its “colonization” of state politics,22 many now argue that states no 
longer serve the values that federalism aims to promote: as a check 
on centralized power, a site for policy innovation and experimenta-
tion, or a means of satisfying divergent preferences on the ground.23  
As a result, theories of federalism are increasingly turning away from 
subnational distinctiveness in their effort to explain federalism’s role 
in American politics.24 
But if one looks within states, geographic distinctiveness and com-
peting identities are alive and well.  Moreover, they seem to be re-
producing many of the political dynamics long associated with feder-
alism and the federal-state divide.  On a growing number of 
controversial policy disputes, the boundaries between local communi-
ties better reflect the fault lines in American politics than the tradi-
tional red-state, blue-state divide.25  Channeled through local gov-
ernments, these divides are creating patchworks of local policies that 
highlight rather than conceal the political cleavages within states.26  
All the while, local policy initiatives are being celebrated as innova-
tions and experiments even—or especially—when they challenge ex-
isting state or federal law.27 
 
 21 See James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761, 
830 (1992) (arguing that differences between state constitutions are not attributable to 
character and value differences between the people living in one state versus people liv-
ing in another). 
 22 See generally Gardner, supra note 14. 
 23 See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 19, at 26–28 (discussing outmoded rationales for federal-
ism and the need for centralized authority). 
 24 See ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 5–9 (2009) (arguing that it is time to move beyond distinctiveness 
as a basis for federalism and proposing an alternative). 
 25 See, e.g., JAMES G. GIMPEL & JASON E. SCHUKNECHT, PATCHWORK NATION: SECTIONALISM 
AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN AMERICAN POLITICS 17 (2004) (reviewing evidence that sug-
gests that most regional political conflict today is not between different states but rather is 
found in geographic divisions within states). 
 26 See, e.g, Paul A. Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 BOST. UNIV. L. REV. 1113, 1117–22 (2007) 
(discussing attempts by interest groups to achieve locally what they could not achieve 
state-wide or nationally). 
 27 See generally Paul A. Diller, Why Do Cities Innovate in Public Health?  Implications of Scale and 
Structure, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1219, 1221 (2014) (examining efforts by big cities to com-
bat obesity and tobacco use that go beyond state and federal measures); see also Charles R 
Shipan & Craig Volden, Bottom-Up Federalism: The Diffusion of Antismoking Policies from US 
Cities to States, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 825, 825–826 (2006) (discussing the impact of city-level 
policies on state-level enactments); BENJAMIN R. BARBER, IF MAYORS RULED THE WORLD: 
DYSFUNCTIONAL NATIONS, RISING CITIES 5–12 (2013) (discussing the challenge of local 
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American states are diverse, and that diversity is not evenly dis-
tributed.28  From urban to rural, from suburb to city, from one region 
to another, one can find in every state a patchwork of distinct com-
munities, each one more different than the next.  Traditional mark-
ers of segregation like race and class play a significant role.29  Also re-
flected are cultural differences that are harder to measure but no less 
real.  And while some of these divides are the product of historical 
processes such as where urbanization occurred and the diverging 
economic trajectories of different regions, much of it is also the out-
come of generations of selective mobility and residential sorting.30  
Young people gravitate to cities.31  Rich people enclose themselves in 
suburbs.32  Republicans move out to the countryside.33  To be sure, 
the specific manner in which each state is divided is often unique.  
Yet the fact that they are divided is increasingly a shared feature of 
every state.34 
But intrastate fragmentation is more than a demographic phe-
nomenon; it is also embedded in the institutional structure of states.  
Cities, counties, towns, villages—the organization of state govern-
 
participation and centralized power and noting the pragmatism and innovation of mayors 
as a result of the fact that they are structurally closer to the citizens they represent). 
 28 See GIMPEL & SCHUKNECHT, supra note 25, at 15–16 (noting that political diversity is not 
evenly distributed within states, which leads to “geographic sectionalism”); see also LIVING 
BLUE IN THE RED STATES 3 (David Starkey ed.) (2007) (discussing political differences in 
different parts of the same state). 
 29 See, e.g., ANDREW GELMAN ET AL., RED STATE, BLUE STATE, RICH STATE, POOR STATE: WHY 
AMERICANS VOTE THE WAY THEY DO 5 (2009) (“Income varies much less among states 
than within states . . . .”). 
 30 See BILL BISHOP & ROBERT G. CUSHING, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING OF LIKE-
MINDED AMERICA IS TEARING US APART 42–47 (2008) (discussing evidence of people mov-
ing to be close to others who share their characteristics, interests, and political leanings); 
GIMPEL & SCHUKNECHT, supra note 25, at 28 (noting that people who move, especially 
those who move long distances, are not a random and representative sample of the over-
all population of the U.S.). 
 31 See Michael Barbaro, With Farms Fading and Urban Might Rising, Power Shifts in Iowa, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 20, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/21/us/politics/iowa-senate-
election.html  (“Those changes have turned Iowa’s older, Republican precincts even red-
der and its younger, Democratic districts even bluer, while giving rise to suburbs whose 
politics can be harder to categorize . . . .”). 
 32 See ROBERT FISHMAN, BOURGEOIS UTOPIAS: THE RISE AND FALL OF SUBURBIA ix-x, 6 (2008) 
(discussing the compositional makeup of American suburbs); FORTRESS AMERICA: GATED 
COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 1–3 (1997) (describing the various reasons why over 
3 million Americans have moved into gated communities). 
 33 See Wendy K. Tam Cho, et al., Voter Migration and the Geographic Sorting of the American Elec-
torate, 103 ANN. ASSOC. AM. GEOGR. 856, 862–63 (2013). 
 34 See GIMPEL & SCHUKNECHT, supra note 25, at 15 (noting that geographic separation based 
on political party affiliation is present in all states). 
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ments in America is highly decentralized.35  Many of the roles and re-
sponsibilities ascribed to states in the federalism literature are, in 
practice, the province of its myriad local governments.36  And there is 
growing evidence that segregation in America is proliferating largely 
along municipal lines.37  Residents sort themselves into particular lo-
calities in order to access government resources allocated on the basis 
of local residency—from access to public schools to the tax bases that 
fund them.38  They also choose particular cities or towns on the basis 
of the culture and “feel” of those communities.39  Of course, this kind 
of local sorting is for many far from voluntary.  Zoning regulations, 
for example, and their effect on the type and cost of housing have 
long been used by communities to fence out “undesirable” resi-
dents—be it racial minorities, immigrants, or the poor.40  Regardless 
of the specific mechanisms that lead to intrastate sorting, however, 
the outcome is the same: intrastate divisions today map surprisingly 
well onto the local government jurisdictions that already subdivide 
the state. 
Local governments not only provide an institutional framework 
through which intrastate divides can be spatially organized, they also 
provide an outlet through which diverging policy preferences can be 
expressed.  As democratic institutions, local governments are politi-
 
 35 See NANCY BURNS, THE FORMATION OF AMERICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: PRIVATE VALUES 
IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS 16 (1994) (discussing the reasons for the formation of local gov-
ernments in America). 
 36 Id. 
 37 Among the various scales at which intrastate cleavages can arise—from broad regional 
divides to neighborhood or even block-level delineations—social segregation appears to 
be growing fastest at the scale of local governments.  See generally Claude S. Fischer et al., 
Distinguishing the Geographic Levels and Social Dimensions of U.S. Metropolitan Segregation, 
1960–2000, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 37–59 (2004) (assessing trends in residential segregation in 
the United States from 1960 to 2000 along several dimensions of race and ethnicity, class, 
and life cycle); see also D. T. Lichter, D. Parisi & M. C. Taquino, Toward a New Macro-
Segregation?  Decomposing Segregation Within and Between Metropolitan Cities and Suburbs, 80 
AM. SOC. REV. 843, 844 (2015) (“We show increasing segregation between places: city-to-
suburb segregation and suburb to suburb.  Places, rather than neighborhoods, are ad-
ministrative actors that often act to include or exclude low income populations through 
their local policies, e.g., accepting or not of mixed-income housing or the imposition of 
density zoning.”). 
 38 See Laurie Reynolds, Taxes, Fees, Assessments, Dues, and the Get What You Pay For Model of Lo-
cal Government, 56 FLA. L. REV. 373, 390–91, 432–35 (2004) (exploring the differences be-
tween various local forms of dues versus taxes and how these funds aid different members 
of society). 
 39 See GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS 
11–13 (2001). 
 40 See generally SIDNEY PLOTKIN, KEEP OUT: THE STRUGGLE FOR LAND USE CONTROL (1987) 
(discussing the historical use of zoning laws to manipulate the makeup of particular 
neighborhoods to the exclusion of particular groups). 
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cally accountable to their residents.  In turn, residents use local gov-
ernments as a political outlet to further their interests and define the 
character of their communities.  As political observers have long 
known, different types of communities prefer different kinds of poli-
cies.  Urban communities tend to support gun control and environ-
mental regulations more strongly than their rural counterparts.41 
Suburban residents tend to favor criminal prosecution and harsher 
penalties compared to those in the central cities.42  Growing intrastate 
fragmentation concentrates like-minded individuals in geographic 
communities.  When those divides are aligned along municipal 
boundaries, local governments provide an outlet for those divergent 
preferences to manifest through policies that further set communities 
apart from one another or the state as a whole.  To be sure, partisan-
ship is frequently the lens through which intrastate policy divides are 
described: cities are “blue,” rural communities  “red,” and suburbs 
somewhere in between.43  Yet doing so often overlooks the degree to 
which many partisan divides are themselves an expression of how 
controversial policy issues affect different communities in different 
ways.  While guns are associated with gang violence in the inner-city, 
they are associated with hunting, sport, and self-defense in rural 
communities.44  While coal mining and “fracking” represent jobs and 
tax revenues in some communities, they are considered environmen-
tal hazards in others.45  From this perspective, partisan divides are of-
 
 41 See Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82 (2013) (distinguishing general gun 
attitude of urban versus rural populations); see also Kirk Johnson, Oregon’s Gun Debate Goes 
Beyond Liberals vs. Conservatives, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/10/03/us/oregons-gun-debate-goes-beyond-liberals-vs-conservatives.html (“In many 
parts of the state, Portland is seen as alien, a place that does not understand the real Ore-
gon.”). 
 42 See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 38 (2011) (discuss-
ing the trend of suburban residents to prefer harsh penalties to deter further crime in 
their areas). 
 43 This is borne out in terms of partisan control.  “Indeed, of the nation’s 30 largest cities, 
just four (San Diego, Indianapolis, Fort Worth, and Oklahoma City) have Republican 
mayors, and even they have to swim with the urban tides.  Mayor Greg Ballard of Indian-
apolis supported increased federal aid to mass transit and opposed his state’s ban on 
same-sex marriage.”  Harold Meyerson, The Revolt of the Cities, AM. PROSPECT (Apr. 22, 
2014), http://prospect.org/article/revolt-cities. 
 44 See Blocher, supra note 41, at 90–107 (exploring the differences between urban and rural 
gun culture, and the significance of these differences). 
 45 See David Weigel, In Rural America, a Startling Prospect: Voters Obama Lost Look to Sanders, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 5, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/in-rural-america-a-
startling-prospect-voters-obama-lost-look-to-sanders/2015/10/04/5465ce22-6883-11e5-
8325-a42b5a459b1e_story.html (discussing voting behavior in states such as West Virginia, 
where the presidential candidate Bernie Sanders’ embrace of environmental issues 
turned off voters in coal mining communities); see also Thomas Kaplan, Citing Health 
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ten the result, rather than the cause, of the policy divide between dif-
ferent communities. 
These two role of local governments—as institutional units for in-
trastate sorting, and as policy outlets for local differentiation—are 
mutually reinforcing.  People may look to local policies on, say, LGBT 
rights in deciding where to live within a given state.  These choices 
then make it more likely that further policies protecting LGBT rights 
will be enacted in those communities going forward.  Sorting in this 
manner not only explains why Americans’ famed mobility exacer-
bates rather than diminishes America’s geographic divides.  Moreo-
ver, it suggests that interstate mobility, which is often credited for re-
ducing the divide between states, can actually increase the political 
divide within states.  Consider the state of Colorado: while explosive 
in-migration of new residents from “blue states” has moved the state 
as a whole toward the partisan middle, the concentration of this 
growth in communities like Denver, Boulder, and Aspen accentuated 
the political tensions between those communities and the rest of the 
state.46  It is no wonder then that one of the earliest legal battles over 
LGBT rights was in Colorado at the time this political transition was 
in full swing.  Denver, Boulder, and Aspen were some of the earliest 
cities in the country to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation.  Perceiving this as an affront to the state’s conservative 
roots, residents of Colorado Springs and the state’s many rural re-
gions organized a successful ballot initiative to overturn these laws at 
the state level.47  In response, the cities turned to federal courts.  In 
Romer v. Evans, the Supreme Court struck down the state law on fed-
eral equal protection grounds.48  But the intrastate dynamics underly-
ing the dispute were not lost on Justice Antonin Scalia, who, in dis-
sent, characterized the state ballot initiative as an effort “to counter 
both the geographic concentration and the disproportionate political 
power of homosexuals” in Colorado.49 
 
Risks, Cuomo Bans Fracking in New York State, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/18/nyregion/cuomo-to-ban-fracking-in-new-york-
state-citing-health-risks.html (citing health risks for New York Governor Andrew Cuomo’s 
ban on fracking in the state, despite the practice’s potential “as a source of economic 
revival for depressed communities along New York’s border with Pennsylvania”). 
 46 See BISHOP & CUSHING, supra note 30, at 57 (describing the tensions between the new 
“blue” residents of Colorado’s metropolitan areas and the traditionally “red” rural citi-
zens). 
 47 See generally Richard K. Ormrod & David B. Cole, Tolerance and Rejection: The Vote on Colo-
rado’s Amendment Two, 48 PROF. GEOGR. 14 (1996) (discussing the differing views on gay 
rights of those living in urban and rural areas in Colorado). 
 48 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 49 Id. at 647 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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In this regard, intrastate divisions not only represent a particular 
organization of American society.  Channeled through local govern-
ments, they also represent a different kind of politics.  With their bi-
cameral legislatures and formal divisions of power, the structure of 
state government is certainly designed with intrastate conflicts in 
mind.50  But when the front lines of political disputes are aligned 
along municipal boundaries, it becomes more likely that competing 
local legislatures, rather than representatives in the state house, will 
lead the initial charge.  Thus, for a growing number of controversial 
issues today, the first sign of conflict is the emergence of a patchwork 
of local laws that subdivide the state.  While one local community 
bans “fracking,” another promotes it.51  While one provides “sanctu-
ary” for undocumented immigrants, another is committed to their 
removal.52  This is why the geographic element of intrastate fragmen-
tation matters.  It is not simply that diverse constituents within a state 
desire different policies.  Rather, channeled through the institutions 
of local governments, political disagreements are often manifested 
through competing policies on the ground.53 
Thus far, I have focused on how intrastate divides highlight the 
horizontal competition between competing localities.  This horizon-
tal competition, however, also frames the vertical competition be-
tween localities and the state.  Few in the federalism literature now 
believe that actions by the federal government are the same as actions 
taken by the “united” states.54  The same is true of actions taken by 
states with respect to their localities.  Cities have long complained 
about the suburban and rural biases in state governments.55  Rural 
communities are equally insistent about their oppression by urban 
 
 50 See Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutional Failure, U. ILL. L. REV. 1243, 1243 (2011) (ex-
ploring methodologies of assessing state constitutional failures using specific examples of 
constitutional architectures). 
 51 See Sabrina Tavernise, As Gas Drilling Spreads, Towns Stand Ground Over Control, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 14, 2011), htpp://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/15/us/towns-fighting-tostand-
ground-against-gas-drillers.html (citing counties opposed to gas drilling in the states of 
Pennsylvania, Colorado, and Texas as examples). 
 52 See Rick Su, A Localist Reading of Local Immigration Regulations, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1619, 1633–
42 (2008) (discussing different local responses to immigration). 
 53 See Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, STAN. L. REV. 1745–1805 (2005). 
 54 See Gerald E. Frug, Empowering Cities in a Federal System, 19 URB. LAW 553, 557 (1987) 
(“Some early federalists might have thought that there was no distinction between creat-
ing the federal government and ensuring cooperation among states . . . . But clearly, oth-
ers recognized, as we do, that these two concepts can be very different from each oth-
er . . . .”). 
 55 See Gerald Gamm & Thad Kousser, No Strength in Numbers: The Failure of Big-City Bills in 
American State Legislatures, 107 AM. POLIT. SCI. REV. 663, 664 (2013) (highlighting the 
hardships faced by large cities in advancing their interests at the state level). 
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and metropolitan interests.56  Whether a structural bias exists in state 
government, and what that bias might be, is a subject of considerable 
dispute.57  What is important for our purposes is to recognize that in 
an era of intrastate fragmentation, state actions are often viewed 
through the lens of interlocal competition.  Thus, when the Pennsyl-
vania state legislature prohibited local governments from enacting 
gun control legislation, local leaders in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, 
who had their gun control legislation invalidated, immediately saw 
this as an attack by rural communities: “I’m not going to continue to 
allow some state legislator from Lackawanna County or East Giblip 
County to tell us what we can do in the City of Philadelphia.”58  Simi-
larly, when New York State enacted the SAFE Act, a gun control 
measure, sheriffs in upstate communities revolted, claiming that the 
law was motivated by downstate interests in and around New York 
City.59  These cases are not unique.60  Across a host of different con-
troversial issues, it is increasingly common for state policies to specifi-
 
 56 See, e.g., MICHAEL B. KATZ & MARK J. STERN, ONE NATION DIVISIBLE: WHAT AMERICA WAS 
AND WHAT IT IS BECOMING 25 (2006) (discussing the American urban hierarchy through-
out history); Greg Brophy & Kit Carson, Opinion, The Democrats’ Attack on Rural Colorado, 
DENV. POST (May 11, 2013), http://www.denverpost.com/2013/05/10/the-democrats-
attack-on-rural-colorado/ (Democratic legislators have crafted many urban-centered poli-
cies and forced them down the throats of rural Coloradans.”). 
 57 Compare Nancy Burns & Gerald Gamm, Creatures of the State State Politics and Local Govern-
ment, 1871–1921, 33 URBAN AFF. REV. 59 (1997) (“[In] three states from 1871 through 
1921 . . . . local government and state politics appear to be coterminous.”), with Gamm & 
Kousser, supra note 55, at 663–64 (finding that big city delegations to state governments 
have been historically thwarted in state politics because the size of city delegations lead to 
internal divisions). 
 58 LISA L. MILLER, THE PERILS OF FEDERALISM: RACE, POVERTY, AND THE POLITICS OF CRIME 
CONTROL 4 (2008); see also Luke Ranker, Cities Navigate New Kansas Law Prohibiting Gun 
Regulations, KAN. CITY STAR (July 1, 2014), htpp://www.kansascity.com/news/local/
community/joco-913/overland-park-leawood/article656910.html (“Clayton said open 
carry might have a place is [sic] rural areas, but not in the metro area.  ‘We don’t go to 
western Kansas and tell them how to live,’ she said.”). 
 59 See Thomas Kaplan, Cuomo’s Gun Law Plays Well Downstate but Alienates Upstate, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/25/nyregion/with-gun-act-cuomo-
alienates-upstate-new-york-constituency.html  (discussing debate between rural conserva-
tive New York voters upstate, and urban liberal voters downstate). 
 60 Lawmakers in Missoula, Montana expressed similar sentiments when state lawmakers 
passed a state bill expressly repealing the city’s ordinances deprioritizing marijuana en-
forcement and extending anti-discrimination protections for gays and lesbians: “Leave us 
alone.  For heaven’s sake.  We’re one little town in a corner of Montana that has nothing 
to do with you.”  Charles S. Johnson, House Bill Would Overturn Missoula’s Anti-
Discrimination Ordinance for Gays, Lesbians, BILLINGS GAZETTE  (Feb. 22, 2011), 
http://billingsgazette.com/news/state-and-regional/montana/ house-bill-would-overturn-
missoula-s-anti-discrimination-ordinance-for/article_0262e838-5576-586d-9e51-
2c55e4082bce.html.  It is worth noting that Missoula is the second largest city in the state. 
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cally target certain localities,61 while localities and local officials are 
ever more willing to ignore or deprioritize state mandates.62 
B.  Federalism as a Framework for Intrastate Conflicts 
The site of political conflict is increasingly within states and at the 
local level.  But what does this have to do with federalism?  Federal-
ism, commonly understood, concerns the relationship between the 
federal government and the states.  The central debate is imagined to 
be the balance between federal power and state rights.  On its face, 
intrastate conflicts seem an odd fit.  If anything, one would expect 
federalism to become less important as the site of political conflict 
shifts from the national to the local. 
It is no wonder when intrastate divides come up in the federalism 
literature, it is usually as a challenge to federalism’s relevance,63 or as 
an obstacle that modern theories of federalism must overcome.64  But 
if intrastate divides challenge traditional accounts of federalism’s 
role, they also offer an alternative explanation for its continued dom-
inance in American politics.  Intrastate conflicts may begin at the lo-
cal level.  They have a tendency, however, to escalate into federalism 
disputes at the national.  This transformation occurs when competing 
localities successfully lobby the federal government and the states to 
fight on their behalf.  It manifests when localities appropriate federal-
ism claims to defend local policies—sometimes on behalf of “federal 
power,” sometimes on behalf of “state rights.”  It also arises when dif-
ferent communities vie for an increased role in state and federal pro-
grams, especially with regard to how funds and other governmental 
resources are allocated among different communities.  In each of 
these cases, the central divide is at the local level and within states.  
 
 61 See, e.g., Shaila Dawn, States are Blocking Local Regulations, Often at Industry’s Behest, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 24, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/24/us/govern-yourselves-state-
lawmakers-tell-cities-but-too-much.html. 
 62 See, e.g., Erica Goode, Sheriffs Refuse to Enforce Laws on Gun Control, N.Y. TIMES (December 
15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/16/us/sheriffs-refuse-to-enforce-laws-on-
gun-control.html; Taylor Wofford, Indianapolis Mayor Orders City Employees to Ignore Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.newsweek.com/
indianapolis-mayor-orders-city-employees-ignore-religious-freedom-restoration-318068. 
 63 See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 19, at 117 (“[T]he invocation [of federalism] is largely 
rhetorical and constitutes the underanalyzed invocation of an outdated cultural icon.”). 
 64 See Jacob T. Levy, Federalism, Liberalism, and the Separation of Loyalties, 101 AM. POLIT. SCI. 
REV. 459, 459 (2007) (“To be precise, federalism has been discussed in terms that, if tak-
en seriously, would recommend institutions that are much more decentralized and much 
more flexible than federalist institutions really are.”). 
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Federalism, however, serves as the framework through which they are 
resolved. 
Why would local actors turn to federalism?  One reason is what 
federalism brings to the table.  To be sure, federalism means many 
different things to different people.  But for our purposes, suffice it 
to say that it is one of the dominant frameworks for political conflict 
in the United States.  There is a long tradition in American politics of 
framing controversial policy disputes along the federal-state divide.  
And there are good reasons why political actors do so.  Federalism 
comes with a set of stock arguments, can easily be deployed across a 
number of substantive policy areas, and is conducive to political mo-
bilization—all of which help when the substantive arguments for a 
policy position start to lose ground.  “State rights,” for example, 
proved to be an effective rallying cry for defenders of Jim Crow when 
public sentiment turned against the racist justification that underlay 
its creation.65  A similar rhetorical shift also appears to be taking place 
today in the same-sex marriage debates.66  Federalism is also an attrac-
tive forum for political actors because, as a matter of power, the fed-
eral government and the states are the most evenly matched.  As a re-
sult, if one side in a policy dispute prevails at the federal level, the 
easiest way for the other side to compete is to turn to the states, and 
vice versa.  The point here is not that something unique about the 
federal-state relationship explains why federalism disputes are rife in 
American politics.  Rather, it is the opposite: the usefulness of feder-
alism as a framework is what compels political actors to align ongoing 
policy disputes along federal-state lines. 
Given this, political actors often compete to reposition their dis-
putes as federalism controversies.  And local political actors are no 
exception.  Federalism scholars usually do not become interested in a 
policy issue until it has evolved into a federal-state dispute.  As such, 
they tend to focus narrowly on the federalism claims that are made, 
rather than the process by which the issue was cast as a federalism 
dispute at all.  But that process is important.  The Supreme Court 
may describe the federal system as a sorting device: national matters 
 
 65 See KIMBERLEY JOHNSON, REFORMING JIM CROW: SOUTHERN POLITICS AND STATE IN THE 
AGE BEFORE BROWN 9–10 (2010) (discussing the ways in which white Southern conserva-
tives attempted to delay the full-implementation of the Jim Crow reforms). 
 66 See, e.g., Aaron Blake, Gay Marriage Opponents are Suddenly All About States’ Rights. Wonder 
Why., WASH. POST (June 11, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/
2015/06/11/gay-marriage-opponents-are-suddenly-all-about-states-rights-wonder-why/ 
(“Just nine years after a clear majority [of gay marriage opponents] said [same-sex mar-
riage] was a federal issue, 72 percent say it should be decided at the state level.”). 
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to the federal government, local matters to the states.67  But accounts 
of our federal system in the political science literature have long em-
phasized its fluidity.  As Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones 
argue, policy battles are often won by political actors who are able to 
navigate policy issues up and down the federal system in search of 
more advantageous ground.68  For local political actors then, the fed-
eral system is foremost an institutional map that they can compete to 
navigate. 
The advantages that federalism offers provide some explanations 
for why intrastate conflicts become federalism disputes.  Yet the at-
tractiveness of federalism is also rooted in the unique limitations that 
local governments face in American law.  Local governments are con-
strained on multiple fronts.  They have little influence over the poli-
cies of their neighbors, even when those policies frustrate their own.69  
Their policies are subject to being overturned at the state and federal 
level, especially when they are in direct conflict.70  Moreover, given 
their limited power to raise taxes and borrow money, localities are 
distinctly beholden to state and federal funding and compete over 
how those are allocated among them.71  The ability to successfully 
navigate the federal system offers localities a means of overcoming 
these constraints—sometimes even turning them to their advantage.  
By doing so, federalism is often drawn into an intrastate dispute. 
Consider, for example, intrastate conflicts over the spillover ef-
fects of competing local policies.  Short of escalating the dispute up 
the federal hierarchy, there is not much that a locality can do on its 
own in response to local policies in neighboring jurisdictions that 
hinder their own.  A ban on handgun or alcohol sales in one local 
community, for example, is easily frustrated if neighboring localities 
freely allow those to be sold.  Similarly, land use decisions foreclosing 
affordable housing in suburban communities might impose econom-
ic and social harms on the central city where low-income residents 
 
 67 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000) (“The Constitution re-
quires a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local.”). 
 68 See generally FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BRYAN D. JONES, AGENDAS AND INSTABILITY IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS 216 (2010). 
 69 See GERALD E. FRUG & DAVID J. BARRON, CITY BOUND: HOW STATES STIFLE URBAN 
INNOVATION 39 (2013) (discussing the general complexities of local autonomy). 
 70 See Diller, supra note 27, at 1224 (“[C]ourt challenges and attempts to preempt at higher 
levels can greatly affect a regulation’s potential for diffusion . . . .”). 
 71 See FRUG, supra note 39, at 17–18 (“City income is largely based on something cities can-
not control: the willingness of taxpayers to locate or do business within city boundaries.”). 
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are concentrated.72  State and federal laws can address these spillover 
effects by imposing a uniform policy that all localities must follow.  
However, competition over whether such a policy should be adopted, 
and, if so, what that policy might be, often pits localities against one 
another in seeking the involvement of the federal government and 
the state. 
Localities also have limited ability to check state or federal power 
as localities, especially when local policies conflict with state or federal 
law.  Unlike states, localities are accorded no privileged position in 
the federal system vis-à-vis the federal government.  And while many 
states have granted “home rule” powers to their localities, courts have 
been reluctant to uphold these powers in the face of countervailing 
state law, especially on controversial issues.73  As a result, “localism,” 
which focuses specifically on the power and standing of local gov-
ernments, offers little legal or political recourse for localities facing 
state or federal opposition.  To check state law then, localities look to 
the federal government.  To check federal law, localities look to the 
state.  Thus, when states started banning their cities from providing 
municipal broadband service in competition with private Internet 
providers, the cities turned to the federal government to preempt 
these state laws.74  Similarly, when federal law prohibited cities from 
refusing to participate in immigration enforcement efforts, New York 
City defended its “sanctuary” policy by invoking “state rights” and ar-
guing that the federal government was impermissibly “commandeer-
ing” it as an instrumentality of the state.75  Reframing like this does 
not ensure success.  Yet it often provides localities with avenues for 
defending local policies that are not otherwise available. 
 
 72 See So. Burl. Cty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 722–24 (1975) (noting that 
suburban exclusionary zoning laws concentrated poverty in cities, which caused a “critical 
erosion of the city tax base and inability to provide the amount and quality of those gov-
ernmental services—education, health, police, fire, housing and the like—so necessary to 
the very existence of safe and decent city life”). 
 73 See FRUG, supra note 39, at 5 (“[I]n our highly urbanized country, the American legal sys-
tem has chosen to create cities that are powerless to act on their own initiative.”); see also 
ELAZAR, supra note 13, at 205 (arguing that the degree to which municipalities can devel-
op initiatives depends upon the culture and political system of the state). 
 74 See Nixon v. Miss. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 129 (2004) (describing the efforts of mu-
nicipalities petitioning the FCC to overturn a state law banning cities from providing 
broadband service); Thomas Gryta, FCC Votes to Allow Municipal Broadband, Overruling Two 
States’ Laws, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/fcc-votes-to-allow-
municipal-broadband-overruling-two-states-laws-1424969156 (describing FCC ruling al-
lowing some municipalities to provide broadband service). 
 75 City of New York v. United States, 179 F. 3d 29, 33 (2nd Cir. 1999). 
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In addition, localities are uniquely dependent on state and federal 
funds.  These funds allow them to meet the cost of routine expendi-
tures, especially when their ability to raise revenue is legally restricted 
or jurisdictionally constrained.76  State and federal funds also enable 
localities to pursue special projects or initiatives that would be diffi-
cult for them to undertake on their own.  Of course, this reliance of 
localities is mirrored by the fact that the state and federal govern-
ments also rely on local governments to carry out their programs and 
policies.  This mutual dependence in turn makes localities particular-
ly interested in how governmental programs are designed.  Indeed, 
competition over how those funds are allocated and the purpose for 
which they can be used often pits local governments against one an-
other.  And much of that conflict turns on which level of government 
ultimately controls how local funds are allocated—the federal gov-
ernment or the state. 
Intrastate federalism presents an alternative account of how fed-
eralism disputes arise.  In turn, it also presents a different account of 
the type of states that get embroiled in federalism disputes.  Conven-
tional accounts of federalism often assume that its purpose is to ac-
commodate the interests of outlier states.77  From this perspective, the 
states most likely to initiate a federalism challenge against the federal 
government are those most out of step with the national norm, espe-
cially if they deviate in ways that are rooted in the unique cultural and 
political history of the state.  Intrastate federalism, however, suggests 
that federalism is also likely to be invoked when the opposite is true: 
by states that are internally divided, whose political identities are con-
tested, and whose demographic composition is undergoing dramatic 
change.  Divisions within states spur intrastate conflicts.  These con-
flicts are more pressing when the political identity of the state is in 
flux.  And a state’s political identity is most likely to be contested 
when different demographic constituents lay claims.  Of course, the 
ability of local political actors to navigate intrastate conflicts into the 
federalism arena often depends on their ability to align the federal 
government and the states on opposing sides.  But intrastate federal-
ism predicts that divided states are just as likely as homogeneous 
states to find themselves involved in federal-state controversies. 
 
 76 See FRUG & BARRON, supra note 69, at 16 (discusing the limiting effect of state laws on 
municipal power). 
 77 See Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1939–
47 (1995) (describing how conditional grants of funds are used to entice “outlier” states 
into changing their laws). 
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Given the local roots of intrastate federalism disputes, the theory 
also suggests that local policies may play a larger role in federalism 
disputes than traditional theories suggest.  Many have commented on 
how shifts in the federalism balance can benefit specific localities, 
sometimes in counterintuitive ways.78  But, for the most part, they por-
tray this as an incidental effect and not itself a causal factor.  In nego-
tiating the federal-state balance, the argument goes, the state-local or 
local-local relationship is also affected.  Intrastate federalism, howev-
er, suggests that sometimes the purpose is reversed: federalism can be 
used as a means of determining which local policy survives and which 
fails.  As a result, it predicts that federalism disputes will often revolve 
around both efforts to restrict and efforts to empower certain locali-
ties to the benefit or detriment of others.  This is especially likely 
when local governments are at the front lines of the particular issue 
being debated. 
In short, intrastate federalism assumes that localities are self-
interested.  It recognizes, however, that in many cases this self-interest 
is best served by appealing to the federal government or the state.  
Local political actors may have no particular interest in the federal-
state balance of power as such.  Nor are they necessarily likely to see 
their interests aligned with either the federal government or the 
states across all policy matters, especially as political control at both 
levels changes over time.  Nevertheless, in order to advance local in-
terests, the structure of our federal system and the standing of local 
governments create strong incentives for local political actors to look 
to federalism as a forum for intrastate conflicts.  As Edward Purcell Jr. 
argues, the myriad ways that local interests selectively turn to the fed-
eral government and the states to achieve tangible policy outcomes 
produces a “kaleidoscope politics” that makes it hard to figure out 
what the federal or state interests actually are.79  But that, in many 
ways, is part of the point: federal and state interests are in many cases 
proxies for competing local interests within states. 
 
 78 See Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era of State 
Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 961 (2007) (arguing that courts have allowed local gov-
ernments to invoke federal authority to resist state government action); Roderick M. 
Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of Federal Law to Free State and Local Officials from State 
Legislatures’ Control, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1201 (1999) (discussing the delegation of federal 
power to state and local institutions against the will of state legislatures). 
 79 See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE: A HISTORICAL INQUIRY 93–107 (2007) (describing power 
struggles between city, town, and county governments). 
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C.  Intrastate Federalism in Action 
My argument thus far is that intrastate conflicts are often at the 
heart of federalism disputes.  The usefulness of this model, however, 
depends on how well it explains federalism controversies on the 
ground.  A few examples have been introduced thus far to illustrate 
some of the structural foundations of my theory.  The goal in this sec-
tion is to examine in more detail how intrastate federalism plays out 
in a number of concrete federalism disputes. 
1.  Dual Federalism and the Competition for Federal and State Support 
The most basic understanding of federalism in America is as a sys-
tem of dual sovereignties, in which the federal government and the 
states occupy separate and independent spheres of power.80  As a re-
sult, the quintessential federalism dispute is often imagined to be a 
jurisdictional battle that directly involves the federal government and 
the states.  Under this view, federalism disputes arise when one side 
of the federal-state divide attempts to expand the scope of its power 
beyond its prescribed limits.  And federalism disputes are resolved 
when the lines between the federal and state power are clarified, ei-
ther by the courts or through the political process. 
Direct federal-state conflict of this kind is a staple in American 
politics.  The confrontation between federal marshals and state 
troopers over segregation in states like Alabama during the 1960s is 
one such example.  It can also be seen in recent controversies, such 
as the federal government’s lawsuit challenging the constitutionality 
of Arizona’s immigration enforcement law, S.B. 1070.  Federalism 
showdowns such as these are often upheld as examples of the contin-
ued salience of the federal-state divide.  They are also invoked to call 
attention to interstate divisions, particularly how certain states, like 
Alabama and Arizona, fall outside of the national norm.  But, as I ar-
gue here, intrastate disputes play as much of a role as the jurisdic-
tional divide between the federal government and the states. 
How are intrastate conflicts involved when claims of federal power 
and state rights collide?  Let’s start with the federalism standoff over 
civil rights in the 1960s.  The conventional civil rights narrative hews 
closely to the traditional federalism framework.  Civil rights, we are 
told, divided the North from the South, the federal government from 
 
 80 See, e.g., RYAN, supra note 11, at 3 (describing this conception of federalism as “idealizing 
the state and federal governments as operating in mutually exclusive jurisdictional 
spheres”). 
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the states.  Yet violent opposition to desegregation broke out in 
northern and southern states alike.81  Moreover, when federal-state 
conflicts arose, it often involved states that were themselves fiercely 
divided.  Few can forget the iconic image of then-Governor George 
Wallace of Alabama physically barring the entry of black students and 
federal marshals from entering segregated schools.  But what is often 
overlooked is the extent to which this federalism showdown was pre-
cipitated by years of local tensions in which competing sides clam-
ored for state and federal support.  Whites who supported Jim Crow 
marshalled the power of local governments and sought the support 
of the state in resisting federal desegregation orders.82  At the same 
time, Blacks and their supporters countered local resistance in court 
and repeatedly appealed for assistance from the federal govern-
ment.83  By the time federal and state officials met on the steps of Al-
abama schools, the intrastate conflict over desegregation and civil 
rights had become so volatile and well publicized that it was impossi-
ble to ignore.84  Indeed, by many accounts, it was only because the in-
trastate conflicts had reached a boiling point that the federal gov-
ernment finally intervened on behalf of the local actors seeking their 
involvement.85 
As it was in the past, intrastate conflict also appears to be at the 
center of federal-state showdowns today.  Consider the recent federal-
ism controversy over Arizona’s controversial immigration enforce-
ment law, S.B. 1070.  When the state enacted the law in 2010, it 
claimed that states had inherent powers to regulate and enforce im-
 
 81 See generally THOMAS J. SUGRUE, SWEET LAND OF LIBERTY: THE FORGOTTEN STRUGGLE FOR 
CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE NORTH (2008) (discussing the movement for racial equality in the 
northern states). 
 82 See CLIVE WEBB, MASSIVE RESISTANCE: SOUTHERN OPPOSITION TO THE SECOND 
RECONSTRUCTION 25–26 (2005). 
 83 See JACK M. BLOOM, CLASS, RACE, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 151–52 (1987) (de-
scribing the difficulties that Blacks faced in securing assistance from the federal govern-
ment). 
 84 See TAYLOR BRANCH, AT CANAAN’S EDGE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1965–68, at 54–57, 
119–120, 122–23 (2006) (describing the violence associated with the Selma to Montgom-
ery marches of 1965). 
 85 See generally MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS  (2004) (describing 
the movement for racial equality with a focus on the actions of the Supreme Court); 
DENNIS CHONG, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2014).  Not sur-
prisingly, it was also intrastate divides that ended up being used to maintain segregation, 
now along municipal boundaries, following the legal dismantling of Jim Crow in the 
South.  See KEVIN M. KRUSE, WHITE FLIGHT: ATLANTA AND THE MAKING OF MODERN 
CONSERVATISM 8 (2013). 
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migration within its state.86  Upon its enactment, however, the federal 
government filed suit challenging the law for infringing on its “plena-
ry power” over immigration.87  States from across the country quickly 
joined the litigation, lining up behind both Arizona and the federal 
government.88  Cities and other local governments in Arizona, howev-
er, also did the same.  On the one hand, local officials and represent-
atives from Phoenix, Flagstaff, Mesa, Tucson, among others, submit-
ted affidavits and amicus briefs in support of the federal government, 
with some filing lawsuits of their own against the state.89  On the other 
hand, the state drew support from Maricopa County, which encom-
passes Phoenix and its surrounding suburbs.90 
It is tempting to see the intrastate divide in Arizona as a byproduct 
of federal-state contestation over the constitutionality of the state’s 
law.  Yet in many ways, intrastate conflicts over immigration both pre-
ceded and motivated the federalism dispute over S.B. 1070 that fol-
lowed.  Long before Arizona passed its immigration enforcement 
 
 86 See Suzy Khimm, The Man Behind Arizona’s Immigration Law, MOTHER JONES (May 7, 2010), 
http://motherjones.com/politics/2010/05/kobach-arizona-immigration-law  (describing 
the idea that states have “inherent authority to enforce federal immigration laws”). 
 87 See Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum of Law in Support 
Thereof at 13–15, United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010) (No. 2:10-
cv-1413-NVW) (arguing that it is unlawful to set immigration policy at the state level). 
 88 Compare Brief for the States of New York, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Vermont as Amici Curiae in Sup-
port of Respondent, Arizona v. United States, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 2012 WL 1054493 (2012) 
(supporting the federal government’s position), with Brief of Amici Curiae State of Mich-
igan and Fifteen Other States in Support of the Petitioners, Arizona v. U.S., 132 S.Ct. 
2492, 2012 WL 523350 (2012) (supporting Arizona’s position). 
 89 See Declaration of Roberto Villaseñor, United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. 
Ariz. 2010) (No. CV 10-1413-PHX-SRB), http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/
declaration-of-roberto-villasenor.pdf (arguing that the Arizona law would divert police of-
ficers from their traditional “patrol and enforcement” duties); Declaration of Phoenix Po-
lice Chief Jack Harris, United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010) (No. 
CV 10-1413-PHX-SRB), http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/declaration-of-jack-
harris.pdf (arguing that the Arizona law would have a negative effect on police relations 
with the community); Declaration of Tony Estrada, United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 
2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010) (No. CV 10-1413-PHX-SRB), www.justice.gov/opa/documents/
declaration-of-tony-estrada.pdf (arguing that the Arizona law would undermine law en-
forcement’s ability to set their own priorities); Amicus Curiae Brief of the Arizona Cities 
of Flagstaff, Tolleson, San Luis, and Somerton in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee, United 
States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011), 2010 WL 5162523 (describing the budget-
ary and public safety problems posed by the Arizona law); Amicus Curiae Brief Submitted 
by the City of Tucson in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee, United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 
339 (9th Cir. 2011), 2010 WL 516252 (arguing that the Arizona law would impose new 
burdens on the police force). 
 90 See Brief of Joseph M. Arpaio, Maricopa County Sheriff as Amici Curiae in Support of Pe-
titioner, Arizona v. United States, 132 S.Ct. 2492 (2012), 2012 WL 506642 (arguing that 
the Arizona law should be upheld). 
214 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 19:1 
 
mandate, Sheriff Joseph Arpaio of Maricopa County was already pri-
oritizing immigration enforcement and carrying out sensational raids 
in cities like Phoenix and Mesa, which he considered to be illegal 
“sanctuaries” for undocumented immigrants.91  Long before the fed-
eral government challenged Arizona’s law in court, the mayor of 
Phoenix and the Police Chief of Mesa were already confronting Sher-
iff Arpaio and urging him to temper his enforcement efforts.92  As the 
conflict escalated, each side sought support at higher levels.  Mayor 
Gordon of Phoenix famously sent an open letter to the federal De-
partment of Justice demanding an investigation of Sheriff Arpaio’s 
practices.93  When the federal government stripped Sheriff Arpaio of 
authorization to participate in immigration enforcement efforts fol-
lowing an investigation,94 the Sheriff publically cast his support be-
hind S.B. 1070, which essentially codified his county’s policies for the 
entire state.95  For localities in Arizona then, the federal-state show-
down over S.B. 1070 was foremost over which kind of local immigra-
tion policy would ultimately prevail.  Indeed, the local stakes were 
precisely how the bill’s sponsor described the motivation behind the 
law: “Striking down . . . sanctuary city policies have always been the 
number one priority of SB 1070.”96 
Federalism framed the civil rights struggles of the 1960s and the 
battle over state immigration regulations in the 2010s.  But in both, 
intrastate divides played an important role.  Indeed, the fact that the 
 
 91 See Scott Wong, Gordon: Sheriff Arpaio Giving State Bad Reputation, ARIZ. REP. (Mar. 27, 
2009), http://archive.azcentral.com/news/articles/2009/03/27/20090327gordon0327-
ON.html (describing criticism of Sheriff’s Arpaio’s remark that Phoenix is a “sanctuary 
city” for undocumented immigrants). 
 92 See Ray Stern, Mesa Police Chief George Gascón Stares Down Sheriff Joe Arpaio, PHOENIX NEW 
TIMES (July 10, 2008), http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/news/mesa-police-chief-
george-gascn-stares-down-sheriff-joe-arpaio-6426648 (describing the City of Mesa’s con-
flict over Maricopa County’s immigration enforcement strategy). 
 93 See Gordon Calls for Inquiry into Arpaio, ARIZ. REP., Apr. 13, 2008, ProQuest, Document ID 
239056668 (providing excerpt from Mayor Gordon’s letter). 
 94 See Yvonne Wingett, Arpaio Investigation Began in 2008, ARIZ. REP. (July 11, 2010),  
http://archive.azcentral.com/news/articles/2010/07/11/20100711joe-arpaio-probe-first-
steps.html (describing investigation into Sheriff Arpaio’s possible abuse of power); Ran-
dal C. Archibold, U.S. Alters Disputed Immigration Rules for Police, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/17/us/17immig.html (describing federal pol-
icy requiring state and local law enforcement officers to adhere to federal anti-
discrimination laws). 
 95 See CHARLES TILLY & LESLEY J. WOOD, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 1768–2012 146 (3d ed. 2013) 
(discussing Sheriff Arpaio’s practicies in Maricopa County and his support for S.B. 1070). 
 96 See Tim Steller, Sr. Reporter: Sanctuary Cities in Arizona?, TUCSON.COM (July 29, 2010), 
http://tucson.com/news/blogs/senor-reporter/sr-reporter-sanctuary-cities-in-
arizona/ article_871e8cd8-9b3c-11df-81d9-001cc4c03286.html (describing S.B. 1070’s 
prohibition on limiting immigration enforcement). 
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federal-state showdown centered on states like Alabama and Arizona 
was due in no small part to the degree of intrastate conflicts that ex-
isted in each.  Alabama was a state divided on civil rights, with both 
sides seeking support from higher levels.  Arizona was neither the on-
ly nor the first state to test the limits of federal power by enacting 
immigration enforcement laws.97  But of the states that did, it was also 
the most internally fractured on the issue.  Local forces locked in in-
trastate struggles appealed for the support of the federal government 
and the state.  As the conflict escalated, these internal struggles 
prompted the federal government and the states to intervene.  All the 
while, intrastate conflicts were reframed as federalism disputes at the 
national level. 
2.  Federalism Claims and the Defense of Local Policies 
Federalism is about the relationship between the federal govern-
ment and the states.  But federalism controversies not only arise when 
the federal government or the states challenge one another directly: 
they also arise when federalism claims are invoked by third parties 
seeking to limit the application of state or federal law.  Criminal de-
fendants assert federalism claims to strike down federal laws with 
which they have been charged.98  Private corporations argue that fed-
eral regulations displace state tort laws in defending themselves from 
civil liability.99  Localities, I argue here, also invoke federalism claims 
in the same way. 
Localities invoke “state rights” in challenging the federal govern-
ment.  Localities invoke “federal supremacy” in challenging the state.  
In each of these cases, the motivation is to protect local policies and 
practices from countervailing state or federal law.  Yet federalism 
provided the legal framework for them to do so.  On the one hand, 
modern federalism cases are filled with instances in which localities 
assert federalism claims on behalf of the state.  Seminal cases like Na-
 
 97 See Rick Su, The States of Immigration, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1339, 1380 (2012) (describ-
ing similar laws passed in Missouri, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Indiana, Georgia, and Al-
abama). 
 98 See United States v. Morrison, 529 US 598, 617–618 (2000) (“We accordingly reject the 
argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based 
solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce.”); United States v. 
Lopez, 514 US 549, 551 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 ex-
ceeds Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause). 
 99 See Catherine M Sharkey, Federalism in Action: FDA Regulatory Preemption in Pharmaceutical 
Cases in State Versus Federal Courts, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 1013 (2007) (describing federal preemp-
tion of state laws in pharmaceutical cases). 
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tional League of Cities v. Usery,100 Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan 
Transit Authority,101 and Printz v. United States102 were all instigated by 
localities themselves.  And while some Justices have expressed con-
cerns over this practice,103 the Supreme Court has largely acceded to 
treating states and localities as interchangeable in the federalism con-
text.  On the other hand, when faced with state preemption, localities 
also argue on behalf of the state.  In these cases, local officials claim 
that following state law would force them to violate federal law.  And 
given the supremacy of federal law under the U.S. Constitution, they 
argue, their allegiance to federal law takes precedence over their ob-
ligation to the state.  For example, when the City of San Francisco 
found its policy of not reporting undocumented immigrant to federal 
immigration officials violated a California law requiring them to do 
so in certain circumstances, the city countered by arguing that the 
state law requirement was preempted by the federal government’s 
plenary power over immigration.104 
In some controversial issues, federalism claims on behalf of the 
federal government and the states are raised at the same time as dif-
ferent localities take competing stances in defending local policies 
from conflicting state or federal law.  Take, for example, the federal-
ism controversy over marijuana.  In 1996, California became the first 
state to decriminalize marijuana for medical use with the passage of 
the Compassionate Use Act.105  Since then, twenty-three states and the 
District of Columbia have followed suit,106 with some going even fur-
ther to decriminalize recreational use as well.107  Despite these devel-
opments at the state level, however, marijuana remains categorically 
 
100 Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (invalidating a federal law requiring 
the payment of a minimum wage to state and local government employees). 
101 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (upholding a federally-
mandated minimum wage for employees of a municipal transit authority, overturning Us-
ery). 
102 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (invalidating a federal law requiring state and 
local law enforcement officials to conduct background checks on prospective gun pur-
chasers). 
103 See, e.g., id. at 955–56 n.16 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“If the federal judicial power may be 
exercised over local government officials, it is hard to see why they are not subject to the 
legislative power as well.”). 
104 See Fonseca v. Fong, 167 Cal. App. 4th 922 (2008). 
105 See PETER HECHT, WEED LAND: INSIDE AMERICA’S MARIJUANA EPICENTER AND HOW POT 
WENT LEGIT 4 (2014) (describing Proposition 215 and the Compassionate Use Act for 
Medical Marijuana). 
106 See 25 Legal Medical Marijuana States and D.C., PROCON.ORG, http://medicalmarijuana. 
procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000881 (last visited June 28, 2016). 
107 See HECHT, supra note 105, at 207 (describing Colorado and Washington initiatives allow-
ing for the recreational use of marijuana). 
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prohibited under federal law.108  Navigating this divide is difficult.  
But over the years, an administrative truce of sorts has emerged: fed-
eral officials follow federal laws, while state officials follow state laws.109 
But what about localities?  This question is rarely asked because it 
is widely assumed that, as subdivisions of the state, localities should 
abide by state law.  But in practice, localities with divergent interests 
on the issue often adopt conflicting approaches that take advantage 
of the federal-state divide.  Some cities stand behind state laws legaliz-
ing marijuana and challenge federal efforts to enforce federal re-
strictions in their jurisdictions.  Others aid and assist federal en-
forcement efforts, while standing behind federal law in defending 
their policies from claims of state preemption.  In doing so, the long 
awaited federalism showdown between the federal government and 
the states is largely playing out within the states themselves. 
Examples of intrastate conflicts over marijuana can be found in 
virtually every state that now permits its use.110  But nowhere is it more 
pronounced than in California, where the movement to legalize mari-
juana began.  This might be surprising given California’s reputation 
as a “liberal” state.  On the ground, however, the political tensions 
within California over marijuana are fierce.  On one side, cities like 
Oakland and San Francisco not only spearheaded the initiative peti-
tion that permitted the medical use of marijuana in the first place, 
but others including Berkeley and Santa Cruz have aggressively 
sought to limit federal enforcement efforts.111  On the other side, cit-
 
108 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 5–6 (2005) (discussing developments in California’s 
marijuana laws and the conflict they present with federal law). 
109 See Robert A. Mikos, Marijuana Localism, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 719, 719–20 (2015) 
(conceding that, although the federal government has largely ceded control of marijuana 
laws to the states, the states are facing opposition from “within their own borders”). 
110 See, e.g., Ter Beek v. City of Wyoming, 846 N.W.2d 531, 534 (Mich. 2014) (resolving a con-
flict between Michigan state law governing the use of medical marijuana and the federal 
Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”)); People v. Crouse, No. 12CA2298, 2013 WL 6673708, 
at *1 (Colo. App. Dec. 19, 2013) (holding that Colorado’s marijuana amendment was not 
preempted by the CSA), cert. granted, No. 14SC109, 2015 WL 3745183 (Colo. June 15, 
2015) (per curiam); Court’s Letter Opinion from Josephine County Circuit Judge Pat 
Wolke to Counsel in City of Cave Junction v. State of Oregon, Case No. 14CV0588, at 3–5, 
(Oct. 16, 2014), http://www.orcities.org/Portals/17/Cave%20Junction%20Trial%20
Court%20Decision.pdf (discussing the issue of preemption with regard to medical mari-
juana laws); Amended Brief of Appellant, MMH, LLC et al. v. City of Fife, No. 90780-3 
(Wash. Feb. 10, 2015), https://www.courts.wa.gov/content/Briefs/A02/467232%20
Appellant%27s%202.pdf (claiming a local zoning ordinance banning marijuana land us-
es conflicts with Washington’s voter-approved recreational marijuana law); see also Mikos, 
supra note 109, at 719–20 (discussing the internal disagreement among localities in states 
with medical marijuana laws). 
111 See Romney, supra note 5 (discussing the ongoing conflict between Bay Area cities and the 
federal government over medical marijuana laws); Malia Wollan, Oakland Sues U.S. to Pre-
 
218 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 19:1 
 
ies like San Diego, Santa Ana, and Upland actively resisted the legali-
zation of medical marijuana under state law, and worked closely with 
federal officials to prohibit the growth, sale, and use of marijuana in 
their communities.112 
But this divide is reflected in more than just whether local officials 
sought or resisted federal involvement.  It also extends into court bat-
tles as different localities invoked competing federalism claims in or-
der to defend local policies.  When the federal government sought to 
close medical marijuana dispensaries in Oakland and Berkeley, the 
cities intervened in support of the dispensaries and filed independent 
claims against the federal government.113  In both cases, the cities in-
voked state law in support of local interests against federal enforce-
ment.114  Conversely, many communities in California have invoked 
federal preemption against the state.  When the County of San Diego 
refused to issue identification cards to authorized marijuana users 
under state law, it defended its decision in court by arguing that it 
was simply complying with federal law, which preempted that of the 
 
vent Closing of Medical Marijuana Dispensary, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 11, 2012),  
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/12/us/oakland-sues-to-prevent-closing-of-medical-
marijuana-dispensary.html?_r= (covering Oakland’s lawsuit to prevent the DOJ from seiz-
ing property leased to a medical marijuana dispensary). 
112 See Savage, supra note 6 (discussing the failure of San Diego and San Bernardino Counties 
to challenge the state’s medical marijuana law); Woods, supra note 6 (highlighting the 
court battle over Upland’s zoning laws that ban medical marijuana dispensaries, despite 
the state law); Will Yakowicz, Cops Raid Legal Cannabis Companies Despite Upcoming Recrea-
tional Vote, INC., (Jul. 28, 2016), http://www.inc.com/will-yakowicz/cops-still-raid-legal-
california-cannabis-concentrate-companies.html (discussing a raid by the San Diego Po-
lice Department of a “legal” medical marijuana company); Jeff McDonald, Marijuana 
Business Owner Seeks Frozen Assets Back, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, (Nov. 14, 2016), 
http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/watchdog/sd-me-cannabis-case-20161114-
story.html (discussing San Diego's use of civil asset forfeiture against marijuana compa-
nies); Alejandra Molina, 2 Santa Ana Pot Dispensaries Raided, Others Warned, ORANGE 
COUNTY REGISTER, (Aug. 21, 2013), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/marijuana-
504798-stores-federal.html (discussing Santa Ana's enforcement against marijuana dis-
pensaries). 
113 See Romney, supra note 5 (documenting the dispute between the federal government and 
the cities in the California Bay Area over medical marijuana laws); Wollan, supra note 111 
(reporting Oakland’s suit against the DOJ to prevent the Department from seizing prop-
erty leased to a medical marijuana dispensary). 
114 See United States v. 2366 San Pablo Avenue, No. 13-cv-02027-JST, 2015 WL 525711, at *2–
4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2015) (holding up the “fact that multiple states and localities have 
enacted medical marijuana laws” as evidence of a “public interest” that weighs in favor of 
Berkeley’s request for a stay in a federal forfeiture action against a medical marijuana 
dispensary); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief & Demand for Jury Trial at 
1, 6–7, City of Oakland v. Holder, 901 F. Supp. 2d 1188 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (No. C-12-5245 
MEJ), 2012 WL 4825003(arguing that Oakland has a significant public interest in protect-
ing the regulations it adopted concerning medical cannabis). 
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state.115  Similar federal preemption arguments were echoed by the 
City of Riverside in justifying its refusal to issue building permits for 
medical marijuana dispensaries within its jurisdiction,116 the City of 
Anaheim in defense of a local ordinance that criminalized the opera-
tion of a medical marijuana dispensary,117 and the City of Garden 
Grove and Butte County, which invoked federal law to defend their 
policies of seizing and destroying marijuana otherwise legally pos-
sessed under state law.118  Not surprisingly, state courts in California 
have not been kind to localities challenging state laws in this manner.  
But just like the cities themselves, the courts also rely on federalism 
arguments to justify their position.119 
As we see in the marijuana context, federalism claims are some-
times invoked by localities on behalf of the federal government or 
their state.  Other times, federalism claims arise when intrastate con-
flicts are recast as interstate fights.  Take, for example, White v. Massa-
chusetts Council for Construction Employers. 120  At issue in White was an 
executive order issued by the City of Boston requiring contractors 
working on city-funded projects to use a workforce at least half of 
which were residents of the city.  The purpose of the order was to 
 
115 See County of San Diego v. San Diego NORML, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 461, 467–68 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2008) (“[San Diego and San Bernardino] Counties argue the [state’s Medical Mari-
juana Program Act] is invalid under preemption principles, arguing the [Act] poses an 
obstacle to the congressional intent embodied in the CSA.”). 
116 See City of Riverside v. Inland Empire Patients Health and Wellness Ctr., Inc., 300 P.3d 
494, 499 (Cal. 2013) (“The appellate court agreed with defendants that the City could not 
assert federal preemption of state law as authority for its total ban on medical marijuana 
dispensing facilities.”).  The court did find, however, that the state marijuana law did not 
preempt local zoning powers, which permitted a city to control whether and how many 
medical marijuana dispensaries could be located within its borders.  Id. at 496. 
117 See Qualified Patients Assn. v. City of Anaheim, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 89, 93 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2010) (“Based [on] its conclusion federal law preempted the state’s medical marijuana 
laws, the trial court sustained the city’s demurrer to plaintiffs’ first cause of action, with-
out leave to amend.”).  Anaheim’s federal preemption argument was not successful at the 
appellate level, however.  Id. at 92. 
118 See County of Butte v. The Superior Court of Butte Cty., 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 421, 424–26, 429 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that the Constitution and laws of the state provide an ave-
nue for relief if the plaintiff can show that he had a legal right to possess marijuana); City 
of Garden Grove v. Superior Court of Orange County, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 656, 658–60 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2007) (“Because marijuana possession is generally prohibited under federal law, 
the City contends the trial court’s order is legally flawed and constitutes an abuse of dis-
cretion.”). 
119 See Anaheim, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 109 (“Just as the federal government may not comman-
deer state officials for federal purposes, a city may not stand in for the federal govern-
ment and rely on purported federal preemption to implement federal legislative policy 
that differs from corresponding, express state legislation concerning medical marijua-
na.”). 
120 White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Emp’rs, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983). 
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combat the effects that widespread suburbanization and systematic 
discrimination had on the employment prospects of black residents 
living in the city.121 
The Massachusetts Council for Construction Employers objected 
because it felt that the order discriminated against workers and com-
panies that operated out of the many Boston suburbs.122  The conflict 
was largely an intrastate dispute.  And as such, Boston had the ad-
vantage; the executive order in question had been issued with state 
support.  If the conflict over Boston’s special order largely centered 
on the divide between the city and its suburbs, the Massachusetts 
Council of Construction Employers realized that its strongest argu-
ment involved reframing the dispute as an interstate battle involving 
the federal power over interstate commerce.  Few out-of-state workers 
were actually affected by Boston’s preference for city residents.123  Yet 
the Massachusetts Council rested its legal challenge primarily on de-
fending the rights of those workers.  This argument proved successful 
at the state court level.  In striking down Boston’s executive order, 
the Massachusetts Supreme Court held the order violated the federal 
government’s exclusive power to regulate interstate commerce.124  
Massachusetts could not, under the Commerce Clause, discriminate 
against labor from neighboring states.  Thus, the court held, Boston 
could not give preferences to city residents if it meant reducing the 
work opportunities of out-of-state residents.125 
But just as plaintiffs prevailed at the state court level by emphasiz-
ing the interstate dimensions of Boston’s executive order, Boston 
prevailed at the Supreme Court level by turning the dispute back into 
an intrastate fight.  To be sure, the Court’s holding was formally 
premised upon its extension of the “market participant” doctrine, 
which exempts states from the Commerce Clause when they discrim-
inate not as a governmental regulator, but as a market participant in 
the course of doing business.126  Yet, as Gordon L. Clark argued in his 
case study of the White decision, much of Boston’s success can be at-
 
121 See GORDON L. CLARK, JUDGES AND THE CITIES: INTERPRETING LOCAL AUTONOMY 85–92 
(1985) (discussing the foundations for the executive order and the community’s goal of 
getting “Boston jobs for Boston people”). 
122 See id. at 98–103 (analyzing the legal case against the executive order). 
123 See id. at 96, 99–100 (discussing the arguments that Boston’s policy violated the Privileges 
and Immunities Act, the Commerce Clause, and the National Labor Relations Act). 
124 See Mass. Council of Constr. Emp’rs, Inc. v. Mayor of Boston, 425 N.E.2d 346, 354–55 
(Mass. 1981) (holding that the Commerce Clause prevents the city from executing its ex-
ecutive order due to the limitations of the market participant exception). 
125 See id. 
126 See White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Emp’rs, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 214–15 (1983). 
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tributed to its strategy of emphasizing in oral arguments the intrastate 
nature of the dispute, and the economic decline and racial segrega-
tion brought upon the city by suburbanization—points that Boston 
had largely failed to make at the state court level.127 
3.  Cooperative Federalism and the Design of Federal Programs 
One way of describing American federalism is as a framework for 
intergovernmental competition.  Another is as a structure for inter-
governmental collaboration.  “Cooperative federalism,” which many 
see as the dominant form of federalism in the twentieth century, de-
scribes the latter.128  Rather than an affront to state sovereignty, coop-
erative federalism argues that federal laws are often designed in part-
nership with the states, and thus empower states to address issues in 
ways that they cannot alone.  Moreover, it recognizes that even as the 
federal government expands, many of its programs rely on state par-
ticipation and the sharing of federal funds.  In spite of what the name 
might suggest, cooperative federalism is not without its share of con-
flicts.  States demand a larger role in the design and implementation 
of federal initiatives.129  They frustrate the implementation of federal 
programs by refusing to cooperate.130  They sue to limit the kind of 
conditions the federal government can attach to federal funding.131 
Like other forms of federalism, cooperative federalism is also a fo-
rum for intrastate conflicts.  Localities play a significant role in feder-
al programs that rely on federal-state collaboration.  Local officials 
are on the front lines of a host of federal policy initiatives—from ed-
ucation to housing to criminal law enforcement.  Localities are also 
major recipient of federal funds.  Whether the federal government 
bypasses the states and works directly with localities, or uses states as 
 
127 See CLARK, supra note 121, at 103–08 (outlining the city’s argument in the White decision, 
specifically its strategy of “reestablish[ing] the importance of the executive order vis-à-vis 
the nature of Boston’s employment and racial problems”). 
128 See, e.g., MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM: A NEW VIEW OF GOVERNMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES 41–57 (1966) (“Afer 1913, and especially after 1935, [cooperative 
federalism] became supreme.”). 
129 See generally ANNE MARIE CAMMISA, GOVERNMENTS AS INTEREST GROUPS: 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL LOBBYING AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (1995) (tracing the role of 
state and local governments in shaping federal policymaking). 
130 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 
1256 (2009) (exploring what the authors call “uncooperative federalism” and showing 
that “[s]tates use their power as federal servants to resist, challenge, and even dissent 
from federal policy”). 
131 See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2480 (2015) (affirming a decision by the Fourth Cir-
cuit dismissing a lawsuit brought by Virginia residents against the IRS in connection with 
the implementation of the Affordable Care Act). 
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intermediaries, it has tremendous impact on state-local relationships 
and the intrastate competition between different localities.  All of this 
raises a new set of federalism issues around which intrastate conflicts 
might arise. 
Take, for example, the federalism concerns raised in Lawrence 
County v. Lead-Deadwood School District.132  At issue in the case was the 
federal “Payment in Lieu of Taxes” program, which provided federal 
payments directly to local governments to compensate for untaxed 
federal land located in their jurisdictions.  Federal law allowed these 
payments to be used for “‘any’ governmental purpose.”133  South Da-
kota, however, imposed strict limits, including a mandate requiring 
local governments to give school districts the same proportion of the 
federal payments as they currently allocate out of their general funds.  
As the parties in the litigation revealed, the question of whether fed-
eral or state law controlled split local governments in the state.  Law-
rence County, with the support of other counties in the state and 
across the country, argued in favor of federal law.134  The Lead-
Deadwood School Districts, which had lobbied for the state law along 
with other independent school districts, argued that the state law 
controlled.135  Before the Supreme Court, the school district chal-
lenged the design of the federal payment program for intruding on 
the right of states to regulate the actions of its subdivisions.  In con-
trast, the county defended its freedom to spend the federal funds as it 
saw fit by asserting the supremacy of federal over state law. 
Intrastate conflict over the design of federal programs also played 
a role in the much broader political battle over President Reagan’s 
“New Federalism” initiatives in the 1980s.136  “New Federalism” was in-
tended to be a reversal of the federal expansion that took place in the 
early- to mid-twentieth century.  It was critical of federal involvement 
in a host of issues that had been traditionally the province of states.  
 
132 Lawrence Cnty. v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 256, 260–61 (1985). 
133 Id. at 261. 
134 See Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amici Curiae and Brief of National Association of 
Counties, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants, Lawrence County v. Lead-
Deadwood Sch. Dist., 469 U.S. 256 (1985) (No. 83-240), 1984 WL 565959. 
135 See County Commissioners to Decide Next Month on PILT Case Appeal, LEAD DAILY CALL (June 
18, 1983) (discussing the battle between the school district and the county, which “has 
argued . . . federal law is ‘supreme’ over state law”). 
136 See generally TIMOTHY J. CONLAN, FROM NEW FEDERALISM TO DEVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE 
YEARS OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL REFORM (2010) (“Federalist rhetoric notwithstanding, 
Reagan consistently favored federal over state and local authority whenever the former 
was supportive of free markets or private sector interests. . . . The Reagan administration 
even took local governments to court when they implemented objectionable policies . . . 
.”). 
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New Federalism remained committed to cooperative federalism as a 
framework for federal-state relations.  Yet it sought to rebalance that 
relationship by giving states a more prominent role in controlling the 
use and allocation of federal funds.  To that end, many programs 
previously controlled at the federal level were converted into “block 
grants,” in which federal funds were given directly over to states along 
with increased discretion over their use. 
But while New Federalism was celebrated for devolving govern-
mental powers and responsibilities, local leaders saw it as a recentrali-
zation effort in favor of the state.  Moreover, many urban communi-
ties saw this shift as an attack on their interests by rural and suburban 
communities seeking a larger slice of the federal funding pie.  From 
President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal to President Lyndon John-
son’s Great Society, big cities benefitted tremendously from the ex-
pansion of the federal government.  The federal government during 
these times was particularly interested in urban issues, and eager to 
dedicate funds to address them.137  As a result, federal-local relation-
ships proliferated, and many cities became accustomed to working 
with, and receiving funding directly from, Washington rather than 
going to their state.138  When Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald 
Ford redesigned the programs in the 1970s, one of their goals was to 
reduce the bias in favor of big cities, and to distribute federal funds 
more evenly among a number of different local communities.139  
When Reagan launched his “New Federalism” revival in the 1980s, 
many cities saw this as a further erosion of big cities’ unique standing 
in federal programs.140  Nearly all federal-local funding streams were 
 
137 See John Kincaid, From Cooperation to Coercion in American Federalism: Housing, Fragmentation 
and Preemption, 1780–1992, 9 J. L. & POL. 333, 384 (1993) (describing historical changes 
to the relationship between cities and the federal system). 
138 See ROSCOE COLEMAN MARTIN, THE CITIES AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 146 (1965) (“Virtual-
ly all city spokesmen, whether political leaders or administrators, find the direct channel 
from city hall to the national capital agreeable; like Mayor Taft . . . they would rather ‘do 
business’ with the Washington agencies than with their state governments.  This view is so 
generally held that it is not necessary to explore it further.”) 
139 JOHN H. MOLLENKOPF, THE CONTESTED CITY 122–27 (1983). 
140 See Peter Eisinger, City Politics in an Era of Federal Devolution, 33 URBAN AFF. REV. 308, 314 
(1998) (“Indeed, the new state power came directly at the expense of cities: Of the cate-
gorical programs consolidated into block grants to the states, 47 had previously delivered 
funds directly to local governments.”); Helen F. Ladd, Big-City Finances, in BIG-CITY 
POLITICS, GOVERNANCE, AND FISCAL CONSTRAINTS 201, 214–221 (George E. Peterson ed., 
1994) (“[C]ities faced significant additional cutbacks in federal aid at the hands of the 
Reagan administration and, in many states, a revolt against local and state taxes.”). 
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severed in 1981.141  Moreover, many believed that instituting states as 
the middlemen for federal funds would favor the suburban and rural 
communities that held sway in state government.  In this regard, the 
political battle over “New Federalism” and the expansion of the 
states’ role in federal programs divided not only the federal govern-
ment, but also localities in many states. 
Intrastate conflicts over the role of localities in federal programs 
can prompt federal-state contestation over the design of these pro-
grams.  Other times, states turn to federal-state contestation as a 
means of resolving or redirecting intrastate conflicts.  The litigation 
over the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act in New 
York v. United States142 offers such an example.  The federal law at issue 
made states responsible for the low-level radioactive waste that they 
generated—imposing upon them a mandate to dispose of it them-
selves or collectively through an interstate compact.  Nevertheless, 
the law’s enactment was a prime example of cooperative federalism 
in action.143  It was designed and endorsed by a coalition of state gov-
ernors.144  It was enacted by Congress at the states’ urging.145  New 
York State actively participated on both ends.146  Thus when the State 
challenged the regulatory regime ten years after it was enacted, and 
five years after it was amended, many saw it as a surprising about-face. 
Cooperative federalism underlies the enactment of the Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendment Act.  Intrastate federalism, 
however, explains New York’s change of heart.  New York’s opposi-
tion was not the result of cultural or partisan tensions with Washing-
ton, or longstanding disagreements about how low-level radioactive 
waste should be disposed.  Rather, it was rooted in the intrastate ten-
sions that emerged when the State tried to develop its own disposal 
plan.  When the State named Alleghany and Cortland Counties as fi-
nalists for its radioactive waste disposal facility, it faced swift and pow-
erful opposition at the local level.  Residents formed human chains to 
 
141 See WALKER, supra note 12, at 256 (“The shifts [of federal financing of the states since the 
1960s], of course, are emphasized in all of the fourteen new block grants enacted since 
1981 andin the severing of nearly all the direct Fedral-local grant ties since 1981.”). 
142 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
143 See id. at 194 (White, J., dissenting) (“In sum, the 1985 Act was very much the product of 
cooperative federalism, in which the States bargained among themselves to achieve com-
promises for Congress to sanction.”). 
144 See id. at 189–94 (White, J., dissenting) (describing the efforts of the National Governors’ 
Association to design and coordinate policy proposals between states). 
145 See id. at 191–92 (White, J., dissenting) (discussing the efforts of the National Governors’ 
Association to get Congress to enact policy amendments). 
146 See id. at 196–97 (White, J., dissenting). 
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block state officials from visiting potential sites,147 shouted down state 
officials in town hall meetings, chased state officials out of the county 
in their cars,148 and confronted state troopers while masked and on 
horseback.149  All the while, the local government officials took the 
lead: towns threatened to close roads, counties mounted legal chal-
lenges to hold up the process, and local district attorneys dismissed 
charges against protesters who had been arrested by state troopers 
(opting instead to admonish the troopers).150  After months of “mas-
sive resistance” the state abandoned plans to site radioactive waste 
disposal facilities in the two counties or anywhere else in the state.151  
Instead, New York joined the counties in challenging the radioactive 
waste disposal regime at the federal level. 
Waste facilities are never popular—radioactive ones even less so. 
Yet the opposition in New York was unique in its intensity,152 and 
much of that was due to the fact that it played into a longstanding di-
vide within the state.  Alleghany and Cortland are conservative rural 
upstate counties in a state widely believed to be dominated by liberal 
urban downstate interests.153  Residents turned to their local govern-
ments because they did not believe they had much sway in state poli-
tics.  And the counties supported their residents because of their own 
feeling of isolation from the state.  All the while, New York State’s ac-
tions throughout seemed to support the counties’ sense of estrange-
ment.  The State seemed genuinely surprised by the local opposition 
that emerged.  It also did not appear to have considered this possibil-
ity when it decided to dispose of the waste itself rather than entering 
into a state compact to dispose of it elsewhere (as many states had 
done).  Pinned into a corner, New York had no option other than to 
redirect its efforts to challenging the federal law when it realized that 
siting a waste disposal facility in-state could not be easily achieved.  
 
147 See Allan R. Gold, Guerrilla Warfare Over Nuclear Waste, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 1990), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/02/26/nyregion/guerrilla-warfare-over-nuclear-
waste.html?pagewanted=all&pagewanted=print (“In December, and again in January, 
dozens of local residents have used their bodies and vehicles to keep officials [away.]”). 
148 See William Kates, Cortland County Expected to Throng Hearings on Radioactive Waste Site, 
SCHENECTADY GAZETTE, Nov. 14, 1989, at 10 (“Taylor officials also have threatened to 
legally close its roads to sitting commission staff, while on another occasion, dump 
opponenets chased state employees out of the county in their cars.”). 
149 See SHERMAN, supra note 8, at 118; see also THOMAS V. PETERSON, LINKED ARMS: A RURAL 
COMMUNITY RESISTS NUCLEAR WASTE 214–19 (2002). 
150 See PETERSON, supra note 149, at 134. 
151 See id. at 160. 
152 Other states faced local opposition as well, but few came close to what New York faced.  
See id. at 71. 
153 See id. at 30. 
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The state’s eventual success at the Supreme Court established a pow-
erful precedent regarding the federal government’s ability to regu-
late states (even at the states’ urging).  But New York’s motivation for 
doing so was largely to resolve the intrastate fight at home. 
*  *  * 
Federalism disputes are formally structured as contests between 
the federal government and the state.  The examples here show, 
however, that conflicts within states and at the local level also play an 
important role.  Told from this perspective, state and federal actors 
are not the only parties interested in using the federalism framework 
to resolve their disputes.  Localities and local actors turn to federal-
ism as well, especially as a way of negotiating their relationship with 
each other, their state, and the federal government.  To be clear, in-
trastate federalism is not a universal account of federalism.  In other 
words, I do not claim that all federalism disputes have intrastate con-
flicts at their core.  Nevertheless, it both complicates and expands 
many of the conventional theories that seek to explain the role of 
federalism in American politics.  Yet why have localities become so 
involved in politics at both the state and federal level?  And how 
much of this is the result of legal developments?  It is to these ques-
tions that I now turn. 
II.  THE LEGAL STRUCTURE OF INTRASTATE FEDERALISM 
Contemporary developments—from the increasing fragmentation 
of states to the growing involvement of localities in state and federal 
politics—play an important role in why federalism has become a fo-
rum for intrastate conflicts.  But the legal foundations of intrastate 
federalism also have deeper historic roots.  In this Part, I argue that 
legal developments in the nineteenth and twentieth century set the 
stage for the kind of intrastate federalism disputes that we see today.  
More specifically, I focus on an aspect of law that is often overlooked 
in the federalism literature: the legal status of local governments and 
their evolving role in our federal system. 
The purpose of this historical inquiry is twofold.  First, it offers a 
new perspective on the history of federalism in the United States. 
Scholars have traditionally marked distinct periods of American fed-
eralism by the relative balance of federal and state power.154  What I 
suggest here is that this balance between the federal government and 
 
154 See supra note 12. 
Oct. 2016] INTRASTATE FEDERALISM 227 
 
the states has historically been mediated through their relationship 
with local governments.  The dominance of states in the nineteenth 
century, I argue, was a product of their ability to consolidate formal 
power over their localities—a power that was not yet established at 
the time that the federal system was adopted.  The dramatic expan-
sion of the federal government in the twentieth century, I maintain, 
was made possible by its partnerships with localities, especially those 
that bypassed the states.  The roots of intrastate federalism, therefore, 
are tied to the evolution of federalism more generally in American 
law and politics. 
Second, this historical inquiry offers further explanation for why 
localities came to see the federal government and the states as ave-
nues for local power.  As states consolidated their power over locali-
ties, localities lost their independent status and were remade as “crea-
tures” of the state.  As the federal government expanded through 
partnerships with localities, localities became beholden to and de-
pendent on federal policies.  In the traditional telling, these devel-
opments undermined the power and standing of localities, which ex-
plains why localities came to see their fate tied to state and federal 
politics.  In the context of intrastate conflicts, however, localities also 
found an alternative avenue to power that had not been available.  
They were now able to assert power against one another by going 
through the federal government or the state. 
In short, intrastate federalism is not a recent or abrupt turn in the 
development of American federalism.  Rather, it is part and parcel of 
the history of federalism’s role in American politics more generally. 
A.  State-Local Relations 
1.  Localities and the Consolidation of State Power 
In setting up the governmental structure of the United States, the 
Constitution divided sovereign power between the federal govern-
ment and the several states.  But states did not emerge sovereign in 
the ways that we understand them today.  The problem was not the 
scope of state power relative to that of the federal government.  Ra-
ther, it was the extent to which states exercised power over localities 
within their borders.  This was all the more important because most 
of the challenges that states faced with respect to their sovereignty 
during this time did not come from the federal government above.  
Rather, states in the nineteenth century were largely concerned 
about the challenges that they faced from below. 
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This may seem surprising given the traditional understanding of 
local governments in American law.  After all, it is now well estab-
lished that localities are mere creatures of the state; they possess only 
those powers that the state has seen fit to delegate.155   But at the time 
that the federal system was first adopted, this was not yet settled law.  
Legal scholars today are fond of pointing out that local governments 
are nowhere mentioned in the Constitution.  Yet at the time the Con-
stitution was framed, there was no consensus on what the legal status 
of localities actually were, or whether they were “governments” at all.  
On the one hand, chartered cities like New York City and Philadelph-
ia were legally recognized as “municipal corporations”—no different 
from what we would now recognize as private corporations.156  And 
like their private counterparts, they exercised much of their power 
through the dispensation and management of property.157  On the 
other hand, unchartered cities and towns were widely understood to 
be communal associations—their power derived from the social obli-
gations and consent of their residents.158  Indeed, Alexis de Tocque-
ville described the notable independence of early New England towns 
as “a natural consequence of the principle of the sovereignty of the 
people in the United States.”159 
Given this, localities in the early nineteenth century did not see 
states as a necessary forum for resolving questions about local power.  
Nor were states actively involved in managing local affairs.  This 
would change, however, as the state-local relationship evolved over 
the course of the nineteenth century.  As urbanization increased the 
size and economic might of cities, states began to see cities as a threat 
to their standing and influence.  Moreover, as cities began to cultivate 
their own political base of power, especially one that drew support 
from Irish and German immigrants, states under the control of 
 
155 See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178–79 (1907) (“Municipal corporations 
are political subdivisions of the State, created as convenient agencies for exercising such 
of the governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to them.”); see also FRUG, su-
pra note 39, at 17–18 (describing how cities only possess power delegated by states and 
limited by judicial interpretation). 
156 See SAM BASS WARNER, THE PRIVATE CITY: PHILADELPHIA IN THREE PERIODS OF ITS GROWTH 
100-02 (Revised ed. 1987); HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE 
CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730–1870 (1989). 
157 See HARTOG, supra note 156, at 23, 33–68. 
158 See FRUG, supra note 39, at 38 (explaining the quasi-corporate powers colonial localities 
exercised by virtue of being a group); 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 
60 (Henry Reeve trans., London, Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts 1862) (relat-
ing municipal independence to the principle of individual sovereignty). 
159 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 158, at 60. 
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protestant “Yankees” become fixated on constraining local power.160  
Of course, cities were not the only localities that raised the states’ ire.  
Towns and rural villages also became subjects of state concern.  This 
was especially true as they became involved in various disastrous ven-
tures, such as investments in railroads and other infrastructure.161  
Through the course of the nineteenth century then, states became 
increasingly interested in controlling the actions of their localities.  
The question was whether they had the power to do so. 
It was against this backdrop that jurists developed the now accept-
ed legal concept of localities.  First, as the number of charter corpo-
rations grew, legal distinctions were drawn between “municipal cor-
porations” and what we now know as private corporations.162  While 
the former were made public and assimilated into the state, the latter 
were deemed to be private and accorded protections from the state.  
Second, localities were not only assimilated into the state, but eventu-
ally subjugated to the state as its creature and administrative subdivi-
sion.163  The first stage of this transition—the distinction between pri-
vate and public corporations—was formulated by the Supreme Court 
in the early nineteenth century through a pair of cases largely con-
cerned about protecting the property rights of private corporations 
from regulation and appropriation by the state.164   The second stage, 
however, which took place in the mid- to late-nineteenth century, was 
squarely focused on the standing of localities themselves, and their 
 
160 See FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A CLOWARD, WHY AMERICANS STILL DON’T VOTE: AND 
WHY POLITICIANS WANT IT THAT WAY 78 (2000) (“Key city functions were reorganized and 
set up as independent agencies shielded from party influence . . . . [a]nd many smaller 
municipalities whose machine leaders carried less weight in state government were simply 
put under the control of ‘expert’ city managers . . . .”); see also Rick Su, Urban Politics and 
the Assimilation of Immigrant Voters, 21 WM. MARY BILL RTS. J. 653, 672 (2012) (pointing to 
the real reason for the state of Massachusetts to take over Boston’s police department in 
the late 1880s as “a strategic move by the native-controlled Republican statehouse to wrest 
control . . . from the increasingly Irish-controlled Democratic city”). 
161 See Joan C. Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Government: The Poli-
tics of City Status in American Law, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 83, 93–100 (1986). 
162 See id. at 39–42 (detailing the development of the distinction between public and private 
corporations). 
163 See Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U.S. 514, 524-25 (1879) (“[C]ities, towns, [and] 
counties[] are the auxiliaries of the State in the important business of municipal rule.”); 
Comm’rs of Laramie Cty. v. Comm’rs of Albany Cty., 92 U.S. 307, 308 (1875) (claiming 
that counties, towns, and cities are “created by the authority of the legislature” and “in-
vested with certain subordinate legislative powers”). 
164 See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 US (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) (denying the state 
of New Hampshire the ability to unilaterally alter the charter of the Dartmouth College 
because it was a private, not a public corporation); Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 
43 (1815) (resolving a church/state land dispute between the Episcopal Church and 
members of the town of Fairfax, Virginia in favor of the Church);. 
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increasingly controversial role in American life.  John Dillon forceful-
ly articulated this view when he penned his seminal treatise on mu-
nicipal corporations.165  Localities, he argued, possessed no powers 
other than those expressly delegated to them by the state.  In turn, 
states not only ruled over localities, but had an obligation to supervise 
their actions and tailor their role.166  Dillon’s formulation did not go 
unchallenged, especially by those who believed that localities, as 
democratic institutions and communal associations, derived their 
powers in part from the people themselves.167  Yet by the time the Su-
preme Court revisited the issue of municipal governments at the 
dawn of the twentieth century, it was able to state—as a matter of set-
tled law—that localities were nothing more than “political subdivi-
sions of the State, created as convenient agencies for exercising such 
of the governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to 
them.”168 
The increasing involvement of states in the affairs of localities, es-
pecially those of big cities, radically transformed the governance and 
politics of the localities themselves.  Yet it also transformed the role of 
the states.  States in the early years of the republic may have been 
content dealing with issues that affected all localities, leaving local is-
sues to the localities themselves.  As the nineteenth century pro-
gressed, however, and the state’s formal authority over localities was 
established, states became involved in micromanaging nearly every 
aspect of local affairs.  To be sure, much of this was in response to the 
behest of the localities themselves; requests for special legislation—
state laws that affect only one or a few localities—accounted for near-
ly half or more of the bills considered by state legislatures for several 
states from the late 1800s through the turn of the century.169  This was 
not surprising given the increasing acceptance that localities pos-
sessed only those powers delegated by the state.  Yet states were also 
eager to intervene in local affairs even when they faced local opposi-
tion.  By the mid-nineteenth century, it no longer seemed out of 
 
165 See 3 JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (5th ed., 
1911). 
166 See id. at 1600–01. 
167 See EUGENE MCQUILLIN, 1 A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 680–81 
(1913) (arguing that even if a municipal corporation ceases to operate without being 
dissolved by a the legislature, “its dormant functions could be revived without action on 
the part of the sovereignty, the sources from which, in theory of law, corporate life 
originally came”). 
168 Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907). 
169 See Burns & Gamm, supra note 57, at 70 fig.3 (depicting special legislation as a proportion 
of total bills for Alabama, Massachusetts, and Michigan between 1871 and 1921). 
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place for New York State’s Governor to inform the state legislature 
that “the municipal affairs of [New York City] will undoubtedly re-
quire and receive a large share of your time and attention.”170  Nor 
was it surprising when a year later the state disbanded the city’s police 
force and replaced it with one operated directly by the state.171  
Whether at the behest of the localities themselves or in the face of lo-
cal opposition, the states’ increased involvement in the local affairs 
upends the standard account that localities were subjects of the states.  
As Nancy Burns and Gerald Gamm point out, if “[t]he ordinary work 
of state politics was local affairs,” then in many ways it can be argued 
that “an ordinary branch of local government was the state legisla-
ture.”172 
2.  States as Forums for Intrastate Conflicts 
Localities lost their independence and autonomy to the states 
throughout the course of the nineteenth century.  The conventional 
view is that they were weakened as a result.  But for many localities, 
state politics became an important avenue for expanding their juris-
dictional power and political influence, especially relative to one an-
other.  One locality’s subjugation may be another locality’s gain.  
Thus in the context of intrastate conflicts, localities began to see state 
politics as a powerful tool for getting what they wanted.  Local politics 
was now state politics.  State power opened avenues that were not 
available to localities as independent actors.  And as intrastate con-
flicts broke out, states became the forum in which the battles would 
be waged. 
Cities, towns, and other localities in the early American republic 
may have initially celebrated their independence from state politics.  
But as time went on, many of them would eventually welcome state 
involvement.  As urbanization expanded the size and complexity of 
many cities, local leaders embraced the expansive governmental 
powers that they had become able to exercise on behalf of the state.  
As local governments, they were able to petition for the power to regu-
late, tax, and exercise public authority in ways that were not available 
to corporations more generally, or under the grants they were ac-
 
170 PETER J. GALIE, ORDERED LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 127 (1996). 
171 See id. at 127–28. 
172 See Burns & Gamm, supra note 57, at 90; see also DAVID R BERMAN, LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
AND THE STATES: AUTONOMY, POLITICS AND POLICY 59 (2003) (describing the state as 
“spasmodic city councils”). 
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corded through their initial charters.173  Similarly, as trade across 
America expanded, cities and rural townships alike saw their future 
bound up with their ability to connect to rail and canal networks, 
which required the power, resources, and backing of the state to co-
ordinate and fund.174  For localities in the nineteenth century then, 
state intervention in local affairs could be understood as a means of 
expanding local power. 
States not only proved to be helpful in expanding the nature and 
scope of local power.  They were also necessary when conflicts be-
tween localities arose.175  Indeed, demand for state intervention pre-
ceded the legal developments that subjugated localities to the state.  
Massachusetts towns in the late eighteenth century, for example, bat-
tled at the state level for the authorization to build bridges into Bos-
ton.176  In other instances, states were drawn into inter-regional com-
petition as competing localities vied for economic dominance.  In the 
mid-nineteenth century, Pittsburgh and Philadelphia clashed over 
the former’s effort to convince the state to authorize an extension of 
Maryland’s Baltimore and Ohio Railroad to gain access to markets in 
the southern states.177  But as cities, counties, and townships fought in 
the state house to secure their place in emerging regional economies, 
they also turned to the state to negotiate conflicts between neighbor-
ing localities seeking dominance at the local level. 
Nowhere is this more evident than in the controversial battles over 
municipal annexation that took place around the turn of the twenti-
eth century.  Big cities appealed to states for the authority to expand 
their territorial boundaries into neighboring communities in order to 
absorb the land and tax bases they felt necessary for their continued 
 
173 See HARTOG, supra note 156, at 126–42 (tracing the developments of city power in early 
New York City). 
174 See PURCELL, supra note 79, at 87–88 (detailing the efforts of states to improve access to 
their markets). 
175 Intralocal disputes were also an important reason for state interference.  Indeed, state 
politics over special bills were often an extension of political fights at the local level.  
Many of the most contentious instances of state interference in local affairs—a state bill 
locating Philadelphia’s City Hall in Penn Square, a state law constraining the power of 
Cincinnati’s city council—were urged by local forces who had lost at the local level.  The 
state offered another opportunity to carry on the fight and in some cases prevail.  See Jon 
C. Teaford, Special Legislation and the Cities, 1865–1900, 23 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 189, 211–12 
(1979) (“Lawmaking authority was thus divided, but it was not divided between a central-
izing and dictatorial state and a victimized city. Instead, it was divided between two sets of 
locally-elected officers, and in cities with independent park boards, police commissions, 
or boards of public works between three or four sets.”). 
176 PURCELL, supra note 79, at 94. 
177 Id. at 95. 
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growth and prosperity.178  While many suburban communities were 
eager to consolidate in order to gain access to the utilities and ser-
vices that big cities were able to provide, others turned to states to 
take over those utilities and services so that they could gain access 
without losing their independence.179  State policies transitioned over 
this period from favoring metropolitan consolidation to fragmenta-
tion,180 setting the stage for the kind of intrastate divides that we see 
today.  But it was clear to localities that their fate was bound up with 
state politics. 
It may not be surprising then that the Supreme Court’s most im-
portant pronouncement on the legal standing of American locali-
ties—Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh181—would take place in the context of 
an intrastate fight.  At issue in Hunter was the constitutionality of a 
Pennsylvania law that consolidated the City of Allegheny into its 
neighbor, the City of Pittsburgh.  In response to this consolidation, 
residents of the now-defunct Allegheny filed suit, alleging that various 
constitutional rights had been violated when the state abolished their 
locality and made them residents of their former neighbor.182  In re-
jecting the residents’ claim, the Supreme Court held that the City of 
Allegheny was but a “mere creature” of the State.183  The State 
breathes life into localities.  As a result, the State was free to abolish 
or reorganize them in any way that it saw fit.  Neither Allegheny nor 
its residents, the Court held, had any claim of right against Pittsburgh 
or the State. 
As a local government decision, Hunter confirmed the status of 
American localities as mere creatures of the states that created them.  
As a federalism decision, it also recognized the plenary power that 
states exercised over their subdivisions, and the judicial restraint that 
federal courts should exercise in reviewing how states exercised that 
power.  But all of this took place in the context of a battle between 
Pittsburgh and Allegheny over their respective standing in the emerg-
ing metropolis.  Pittsburgh had long sought to annex Allegheny, 
which it saw as its most potent economic rival.  Allegheny had long 
resisted Pittsburgh’s efforts, given that it had begun to match, if not 
 
178 See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 144–46 (1985) (detailing the  motives of cities when seeking to expand their terri-
torial boundaries). 
179 See id. at 146–51 (discussing the city annexations of suburban areas and how resistance to 
them changed over time). 
180 Id. at 152. 
181 207 U.S. 161 (1907). 
182 Id. at 176–78. 
183 Id. at 178. 
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exceed, Pittsburgh in terms of industrial output and was attracting 
many of Pittsburgh’s wealthier residents.184  Pittsburgh gained the up-
per hand only by going to the state.  Losing at the state level, Alle-
gheny had no choice but to turn to federal courts and the U.S. Con-
stitution.  The reasoning of Hunter was couched in the language of 
state power and federalism principles.  But for the parties involved, 
the outcome was profoundly local: Allegheny lost and Pittsburgh 
won.  The future of Pittsburgh, at least for the time being, was secure. 
As Hunter showed, localities’ subordination to states also turned 
states into an avenue for their empowerment.  The localist relation-
ship between the state and its localities is always double-sided when 
intrastate conflicts are at play.  When state-enabled annexations were 
the norm, many cities benefited from their ability to absorb sur-
rounding communities.  Pittsburgh was only one example; cities all 
across the country turned to the state as a means of expanding their 
power and influence, not only with respect to their residents and 
businesses, but also vis-à-vis their regional neighbors.  To be sure, 
state involvement was not always to a locality’s advantage.  Widening 
political gaps between state houses and city halls meant that states of-
ten sought to take over institutions of local government in order to 
bring them under state control.  But the lessons for cities and other 
localities were all the same.  In an era of intrastate conflict and local 
subordination to states, the ability to navigate state politics was the 
only sure way for a local community to protect and advance its inter-
ests. 
3.  Home Rule and Continued State Involvement 
As a matter of law, the “state creature” idea of local governments, 
and the deference to state power mandated by Dillon’s Rule, gave way 
to the success of the “Home Rule” movement of the early twentieth 
century.  In states that adopted Home Rule, localities were granted 
the power to act without state authorization and provided certain 
protections from state interference.185  Yet the lessons that localities 
learned about the significance of state politics endured.  Judicial def-
erence to states meant that localities could never rely on Home Rule 
to free themselves from the interference of states.  At the same time, 
Home Rule equalized the legal standing of nearly all local govern-
ments, which in turn shifted the intrastate balance between localities, 
 
184 See generally LISA A. MILES, RESURRECTING ALLEGHENY CITY: THE LAND, STRUCTURES & 
PEOPLE OF PITTSBURGH’S NORTH SIDE (2007). 
185  See DALE KRANE ET AL., HOME RULE IN AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE HANDBOOK 11–12 (2001). 
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especially among cities and their suburban neighbors.  As a result, 
state politics continued to play an important role in how localities de-
fined their power and authority. 
Home Rule was proposed as a response to the growing involve-
ment of states in local affairs.  It urged greater autonomy for locali-
ties.  It also sought to restrict their micromanagement by the state.  
The Home Rule movement sought to achieve the former by urging 
states to delegate broad—and at times exclusive—powers to localities 
over “local affairs.”  The latter was addressed through state constitu-
tional limitations over the ability of states to enact “special legislation” 
that only affected one or a small number of localities.  Support for 
Home Rule came from many competing political circles, each with 
different visions of the role of localities.186  Yet the movement was 
widely successful.  By the mid-twentieth century, Home Rule had 
eclipsed Dillon’s Rule in a majority of states.187 
Yet the practical effect of Home Rule never lived up to its prom-
ise.  On the one hand, state courts routinely ignored prohibitions on 
special legislation.188  Many states wrote around these prohibitions by 
enacting general laws that could only apply to one locality; Alabama, 
for example, created the position of treasurer for all counties with 
populations between 21,425 and 21,450.189  And not only did state 
courts largely accept these end runs, but localities, many of which 
were requesting special legislation, often agreed.  On the other hand, 
state courts largely embraced a limited construction of “local affairs” 
in interpreting Home Rule authority, especially when states expressed 
interest on an issue.  This is not to say that the grants of power under 
Home Rule are toothless.  Rather, it is to suggest that because they 
are open to judicial interpretation and state interference, relying on 
Home Rule is often less secure than simply requesting specific powers 
to act from the state.  Indeed, in a study of Home Rule in Massachu-
setts—traditionally considered a strong Home Rule state—most local 
officials understood Home Rule primarily as a mechanism for asking 
 
186 See generally David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255 (2003) (discuss-
ing the arguments of adversaries to Home Rule and their suggestions for what should op-
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the state for permission (via the “Home Rule Petition”), rather than a 
source of authority outside of state authorization.190 
Where Home Rule may have had its most significant effect is with 
respect to the mutual standing of localities relative to one another.  
Home Rule may not have been all that successful in freeing localities 
from state interference or granting localities a protected sphere of 
local authority.  Yet it has been consistently invoked to protect the 
territorial integrity of localities, and has at times limited state efforts 
to redistribute local funds to neighboring jurisdictions.191  This is not 
insignificant; Home Rule provides a defense against the kind of reor-
ganization that abolished the City of Allegheny in Hunter v. Pittsburgh. 
But the protection that Home Rule provided also limited the power 
that localities, especially struggling cities in the mid-twentieth centu-
ry, were able to exercise through the state.  Indeed, despite the prom-
ises of Home Rule, many now see it largely as a force for parochialism 
and fragmentation, especially in favor of suburban jurisdictions.192  In 
short, Home Rule did little to disentangle state and local politics.  
Nor did localities turn away from state politics as a forum for intra-
state conflicts.  Like Dillon’s Rule before it, Home Rule worked to the 
benefit of certain localities relative to others—a shift that was already 
occurring in state law and politics both before and after Home Rule 
was adopted.  But by the time Home Rule was widely adopted, states 
were no longer the only political forum in which localities sought to 
advance their interests. 
 
190 David J. Barron, Gerald E. Frug & Rick T. Su, Dispelling the Myth of Home Rule: Local Power 
in Greater Boston, in 3 GOVERNING GREATER BOSTON xi–xiii (Rappaport Inst. for Greater 
Bos. ed., 2004). 
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B.  Federal-Local Relations 
1.  Cities and the Expansion of Federal Power 
 
If the federalism balance in the nineteenth century favored the 
state, then the twentieth century was the era of the federal govern-
ment.  The public support and industrial mobilization needed to 
fight the two World Wars gave rise to a distinctly national conscious-
ness.  The rise of mass media and mass marketing fashioned a con-
spicuous American culture.  All the while, the federal government 
dramatically expanded the scope and reach of its laws.  Work stand-
ards and labor relations, housing and poverty, crime and moral legis-
lation—no issue was too small for federal regulation.  To be sure, as 
Jon Teaford points out, states did not wither away in the face of fed-
eral expansion.193  But the ascendance of the federal government cer-
tainly reoriented the federalism balance away from states. 
The growth and expansion of the federal government in the twen-
tieth century is ordinarily thought of as an era of centralization.  As a 
result, one might assume that this development undermined the po-
litical standing of localities.  But that view is too simplistic; it ignores 
the fact that the rise of federal power rested in part on the federal 
government becoming more deeply involved in local affairs.  As the 
attention of the federal government turned inwards and downwards, 
localities presented themselves as willing and able participants in fed-
eral programs.  In turn, many localities received resources and politi-
cal support that bypassed the state. 
If the expansion of the federal government challenged state pow-
er, it was largely because federal programs upended the state-local re-
lationship.  From President Roosevelt’s “New Deal” policies of the 
1930s, to President Johnson’s “Great Society” initiatives in the 1960s, 
Democratic administrations steered the federal government towards 
urban issues and became heavily involved in the plight of American 
cities.  Federal transfers filled holes in big city budgets.  Federal funds 
were used to build up urban infrastructure.  Federal attention also 
turned towards issues like housing, poverty, and industrial labor rela-
tions.  In turn, Republican administrations led by Eisenhower, Nixon, 
and Reagan retooled federal urban programs to promote the rise of 
suburbs, giving way to the increasing fragmentation of the American 
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metropolis.  Federal mortgage standards made it cheaper for devel-
opers to build, and easier for Americans to buy new housing at the 
suburban periphery than in the urban core.194 Federal highway con-
struction expanded the places where one could relocate residentially 
while still commuting into the city for work.195  Urban renewal cleared 
inner-city neighborhoods for commercial development, while shifting 
Blacks and other minorities into geographically isolated ghettos.196 
Given the emergence of America as an urban nation in the early 
twentieth century, it is hardly surprising that the federal government 
would shift its attention downwards and towards American cities.  
Federal attention may have been focused in the nineteenth century 
on rural communities and frontier settlements: homesteading, Native 
American removal, and the pricing of agricultural goods.  But as the 
twentieth century unfolded, it was clear that America was entering a 
new era: the frontier was closed, farms were giving way to factories, 
and by the 1920s, a majority of Americans were living in cities.197 And 
in this urban century, cities also became the site of America’s most 
pressing challenges.  Labor unrest and contentious strikes swept 
through countless cities, each time prompting national attention to-
wards labor relations.198  Urban race riots broke out as Blacks, who 
had left the South for the big industrial cities of the Northeast and 
the Midwest, faced segregation and discrimination, each time driving 
calls for federal attention towards race relations.199  Even America’s 
transition from an industrial to a post-industrial economy was playing 
out in the rise and decline of cities across the country.  In the twenti-
eth century, America had become an urban country.  And as a result, 
national attention turned to urban issues. 
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Oct. 2016] INTRASTATE FEDERALISM 239 
 
But it was more than policy challenges that directed federal atten-
tion toward the cities.  It was also politics.  As John Mollenkopf ar-
gues, the federal turn towards urban policies was also driven by dem-
ocratic entrepreneurs who sought to “construct[] new political 
alignments and new coalitions around the framework of federal ur-
ban development programs.”200  The local level generally, and cities 
more specifically, was where political organizing was strongest: politi-
cal machines and the reform movement, labor unions and local busi-
nesses organizations, churches and ethnic aid societies are prominent 
organizations in civic life.  In their effort to build a stable national 
coalition, Democrats picked issues that they believed could mobilize 
urban constituents as a whole and cut across the lines that divided 
them.  They also fostered new patterns of political mobilization that 
united the various elements that had once divided urban politics.201  
Urban residents in the twentieth century did not necessarily support 
the Democrats because they were partisan stalwarts following their 
party’s lead.  Rather, the Democratic party actively sought urban sup-
port, and reoriented the platform of the party to build an urban coa-
lition. 
For their part, cities and other localities eagerly welcomed federal 
intervention in local affairs.  The federal government provided re-
sources that the state was unable to match, especially as the Great 
Depression drained state coffers.202  They provided support for large 
scale development programs that cities were unable to pursue other-
wise, from highways to subways to airports.  More importantly, they 
provided an outlet for pursuing local interests.  Indeed, for the big 
cities that had long complained about their treatment at the hands of 
state legislatures, congressional support at the federal level and direct 
access to federal agencies offered a new avenue to power.  Tellingly, 
both the U.S. Conference of Mayors and the National League of Cit-
ies were formed during this era, and largely for the purpose of lobby-
ing the federal government.203  In short, the era of federal expansion 
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was also an era of federal-local collaboration.  And in many cases, the 
collaboration circumvented the states. 
2.  Federal Policies and Intrastate Conflicts 
Federal involvement in urban policy reshaped intergovernmental 
relations in the twentieth century.  As a matter of law, localities re-
mained creatures of the state.  But as a matter of policy, localities in 
general, and cities in particular, saw opportunities in federal policies 
that were not available at the state level.  The effect of federal expan-
sion on the vertical relations in the federal system, however, is only 
one part of the story.  Another equally important dimension is how 
the rise of the federal government affected the horizontal relation-
ship between localities within states. 
Metropolitan fragmentation exploded in the twentieth century.204  
State policies at the turn of the twentieth century set the stage by 
making it harder for cities to annex their neighbors and easier for 
suburban communities to remain independent.205  The advent of zon-
ing made it possible for suburbs not only to control the type of land-
use development that occurred in their jurisdiction, but also through 
minimum lot sizes and regulations on multifamily housing to control 
the type of people that could become residents.206  All the while, pref-
erences were changing.  The post-war generation gravitated to the 
open space and new builds that the suburbs offered.207  Persistent ra-
cial discrimination persuaded whites to flee transitional neighbor-
hoods in the city for the security of the suburbs, especially as civil 
rights litigation dismantled segregated neighborhoods, schools, and 
public facilities.208  All across the country, localities were looking less 
and less like administrative subdivisions of the state.  They were be-
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coming insular and distinctive communities with their own racial, 
class, and cultural identities.209 
Metropolitan fragmentation also shaped federal politics.  And 
nowhere is this more evident than how federal urban policies were 
directed towards different constituencies.  As noted earlier, Demo-
crats built their twentieth century political coalition around urban 
voters, particularly those in established big cities in the Northeast and 
the Midwest.  Not surprisingly, Republicans responded by targeting 
their policies towards suburban voters, growing cities in the South 
and the Southwest, and rural communities.210  Despite some lip ser-
vice to the contrary, neither party seriously sought to dismantle fed-
eral urban programs.  Instead, each party shaped federal urban poli-
cies, and allocated federal funds, to support their local constituency.  
The intrastate dimensions of this partisan struggle eventually came to 
define how federal policies shaped the metropolitan landscape.  It 
would also come to define much of the federalism debate in Ameri-
can politics for the latter half of the twentieth century. 
At the same time that federalism was being used to negotiate the 
intrastate dynamics of national partisan politics, a similar develop-
ment was also occurring in the Supreme Court.  Indeed, intrastate 
fragmentation also became an important foundation for the Court’s 
“federalism revival” in the 1970s.  Much has been said about the mo-
tivations and ideology of the Justices that pioneered the return of 
federalism as a matter of judicial concern.  For our purposes, howev-
er, what is worth noting is the extent to which the invocation of fed-
eralism during this era focused not on the unique and distinct role of 
states specifically, but rather the integrity and autonomy of local 
communities—cities, towns, and counties—within them.  Localism, in 
other words, was the framework through which federalism was re-
vived, and the resolution of intrastate conflicts appeared to be the 
purpose for which federalism was used. 
Two cases illustrate the sudden emergence of local autonomy at 
the heart of the Supreme Court’s federalism jurisprudence.  And 
both involved equal protection challenges directed at the manner in 
which states structured their delivery of public education.  In San An-
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tonio School District v. Rodriguez, the Court dismissed a challenge 
against Texas’s funding scheme for local public schools, which relied 
heavily on local property taxes.  Drastically disparate tax bases among 
local communities in Texas—which reflected the class and racial di-
vides between them—meant that prosperous districts were able to 
provide nearly five times more per-pupil spending than poor dis-
tricts.211  A year later, in Milliken v. Bradley, the Court reversed a dis-
trict court desegregation plan that involved busing students from the 
nearly all-black Detroit school district to nearly all-white suburban 
districts like Allen Park and Grosse Point.212  The Court did not deny 
that unconstitutional racial discrimination had occurred; it held 
however that the remedy could not extend into suburban school dis-
tricts even if that was the only way meaningful desegregation could be 
effectuated.213 
Rodriguez and Milliken were dismissed by the Supreme Court on 
equal protection grounds.  Yet the reasoning in both relied strongly 
on federalism arguments.  Federalism, the Court explained in Rodri-
guez, must be considered in “determining whether a State’s laws are 
to be accorded the traditional presumption of constitutionality, or 
are to be subjected instead to rigorous judicial scrutiny.”214  Indeed, in 
rejecting the equal protection challenge, the Court explained: “we do 
no violence to the principles of federalism and separation of powers 
by staying our hand.”215  Similarly, in Milliken, the Court held that fed-
eral courts should tread lightly in formulating equal protection rem-
edies that would intrude upon the legislative judgment of the state.  
As a prelude to the “commandeering” cases yet to come,216 the Court 
reversed the desegregation plan in part because of fears that it would 
effectuate “a complete restructuring of the laws of Michigan relating 
to school districts [and] the District Court will become first, a de facto 
‘legislative authority’ to resolve these complex questions, and then 
the ‘school superintendent’ for the entire area.”217 
The federalism principles that the Court invoked in these cases, 
however, were not limited to its deference to states.  What was most 
striking was the extent to which federalism served as a means of pro-
 
211 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 8, 11–15 (1973). 
212 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
213 Id. at 744–45. 
214 See Williams, supra note 161, at 105–15. 
215  Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 58. 
216 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 
898, 902 (1997). 
217  Milliken, 418 U.S. at 743–44. 
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tecting, in the Court’s words, “local autonomy” and “local control.”218  
To be sure, it is not uncommon for courts to use “state” and “local” 
interchangeably in the federalism context, confusing the jurisdiction-
al divide between states and their subdivisions.  But there was no con-
fusion here.  Indeed, the Court’s use of “local” could not have been 
any more precise.  Using federalism language usually reserved for 
states, the Rodriguez Court praised educational systems like the one in 
Texas for allowing “[e]ach locality . . . to tailor local programs to local 
needs,” while at the same time “afford[ing] opportunity for experi-
mentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for educational ex-
cellence.”219  Similarly, in much the same way the Supreme Court talks 
about sanctity of state boundaries, the Milliken Court added that the 
“notion that school district lines may be casually ignored or treated as 
a mere administrative convenience is contrary to the history of public 
education in our country,” especially given that “[n]o single tradition 
in public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the 
operation of schools.”220   From this perspective, what the Court 
seemed intent on protecting through federalism was not necessarily 
the right of the state to structure its public schools free of federal in-
terference.  Rather, it seemed to be limiting the scope of equal pro-
tection precisely to defend the very specific choice of these states to 
fragment public education into a number of distinct and independ-
ent school districts. 
Why this specific focus on the local?  Part of the reason is that 
pursuing this route allowed the Court to navigate around earlier 
precedents that firmly subject states and state policies to the equal pro-
tection clause and other constitutional rights.221  But it is also im-
portant to recognize that for all the discussion of federalism and local 
autonomy, Rodriguez and Milliken were largely intrastate disputes.  
The structure of constitutional civil rights litigation required the 
plaintiffs to state their claims in terms of individual rights.  But the 
alleged harm was the product of local government structures that pit-
ted communities against communities—Detroit against its suburbs in 
Milliken, poor against wealthy communities in Rodriguez.  This is why 
the alignment of the parties in these cases shifted so dramatically.  
While plaintiffs originally sued the San Antonio School District in Ro-
driguez, the district petitioned to be removed as a defendant and 
eventually joined the plaintiffs as amici in challenging the state and 
 
218 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 50. 
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220 Milliken, 418 U.S. at 741. 
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other school districts.222  Similarly, while the interdistrict remedy 
crafted in Milliken was based in part on past racial discrimination by 
the Detroit School Board, the school board also changed sides by 
aligning with the plaintiffs in favoring the metropolitan remedy on 
appeal and before the Supreme Court.223  As the dissents in both the-
se cases point out, the “local autonomy” that concerned the Court 
was not local autonomy in the general sense.  Rather, it was the au-
tonomy of certain localities to be free from the claims and demands 
of others in an intrastate fight.224 
From this perspective, local autonomy was not a way for the Court 
to invoke federalism to insulate states from constitutional challenges.  
Rather, federalism was invoked as a way of insulating certain commu-
nities from claims made by others.  In other words, the Supreme 
Court did not “confuse[] localism with federalism.”225  Federalism was 
being used specifically to address localism.  At the risk of sounding 
crass, what the Court was interested in protecting in Rodriguez and 
Milliken was the wealthy and white suburban communities that were 
insulating themselves from the central city and other poor suburbs.  
Texas and Michigan, from this perspective, were the proxies through 
which the Court was able to do so. 
3.  Contemporary Local-Federal Relations 
Vestiges of the local-federal alignment of the twentieth century 
still remain.  Yet many of the programs, funding streams, and rela-
tionships have either withered away or been redirected through 
states.  By the 1980s, the Democratic urban coalition had largely col-
 
222 Brief for Amici Curiae, San Antonio Independent School District,  San Antonio Indep. 
Sch. Dist, v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972) (No. 71-1332), 1972 WL 136437. 
223 See JOYCE BAUGH, THE DETROIT SCHOOL BUSING CASE: MILLIKEN V. BRADLEY AND THE 
CONTROVERSY OVER DESEGREGATION, 134, 138–139 (2011) (“George Roumell, attorney 
for the Detroit board, announced that he would not argue against Judge Roth’s finding 
of segregation but would recommend a metropolitan remedy.”). 
224 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 64–70 (White, J., dissenting) (“[T]he State must fashion a fi-
nancing scheme which provides a rational basis for the maximization of local control, if 
local control is to remain a goal of the system . . . .”); id. at 126–29 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (“[I]t is apparent that the State’s purported concern with local control is offered 
primarily as an excuse rather than as a justification for interdistrict inequality.”); Milliken,  
717 U.S. at 800–08 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Ironically, by ruling out an interdistrict 
remedy . . . the majority flouts the very principle on which it purports to rely.”). 
225 Mark C Rahdert, Obstacles and Wrong Turns on the Road from Brown: Milliken v. Bradley and 
the Quest for Racial Diversity in Education, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 785, 798 (2003). 
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lapsed.226  By the 1990s, federal grant-in-aid programs to cities and 
other localities had been dramatically reduced.227  Moreover, with the 
move towards Community Block Grants, states became the interme-
diary through which federal funds meant for localities were chan-
neled.228  The “New Federalism” of the 1980s did not eliminate feder-
al involvement in local affairs.  What it did, however, was sever the 
direct relationships that many cities enjoyed with the federal govern-
ment while strengthening the role of states. 
But the relationships that were forged between localities and the 
federal government continue to play a role in defining how localities 
respond to contemporary issues.  As noted earlier, when Internet 
providers succeeded in convincing states to block municipal Internet 
services, localities turned to lobbying the Federal Communications 
Commission to reinterpret federal law to preempt the state bans.229  
More recently, when a number of states sued to block an executive 
order issued by President Barack Obama excluding certain undocu-
mented immigrants from deportation, a coalition of localities, includ-
ing many in states that were suing, independently filed an amicus 
brief backing the President, touting the local benefits his executive 
order would provide.230  Even the relationships that were forged be-
tween local police and federal law enforcement during the War on 
Drugs and various firearm task forces proved useful when localities 
sought to circumvent state laws legalizing marijuana or expanding 
gun rights.231  As a matter of law, localities remain creatures of the 
 
226 See MOLLENKOPF, supra note 139, at 255–56 (“Especially during the mid-1970s, the politi-
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state.  But the local-federal realignment that took place in the federal 
expansion of the twentieth century also continues to influence the 
behavior of localities. 
In addition, local lobbying at the national level remains strong.  
Both the U.S. Conference of Mayors and the National League of Cit-
ies continue to advocate for the interests of their members, and large-
ly focus on the reform or enactment of federal policies.232  Issue-
specific organizations, like Mayors Against Illegal Guns and Cities 
United for Immigration Action also seek federal action even if (or 
especially because) many of the obstacles they face are at the state 
level.233  This is not to say that state politics are no longer important.  
Rather it is to show that the close and independent relationships that 
localities have forged with the federal government and the states over 
the years have expanded the field where local issues and intrastate 
conflicts are fought.  Given this, it is no wonder that federal-state con-
flict in the federalism arena is increasingly concerned about local pol-
icies and the political divide within states. 
III.  INTRASTATE FEDERALISM AND FEDERALISM THEORIES 
 
Intrastate federalism outlines an alternative account of why feder-
alism disputes occur.  This Part suggests that it also offers a new way 
of thinking about federalism theories.  Most theories of federalism 
assume that federalism is important because states are important.  
They further assume that this importance is based on the distinctive-
ness of states and their ability to inspire loyalty and affection in the 
American people.234  But in recent years, many federalism scholars 
have become skeptical that states continue to be important in these 
ways.  Even among those who defend the distinctiveness and identi-
 
ring to gun legislation as “beyond [the] power” of Kansas City government and “some-
thing that must be done in the Missouri [State] legislature.”). 
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ties of states, there is considerable disagreement over how they are 
distinctive and the basis of their identity.  Are states socio-cultural 
communities?  Are they sites of partisan affiliation?  Are they simply 
outlets for divergent policy preferences? 
Federalism scholars are right in thinking that geographic distinc-
tiveness and subnational identities are important for understanding 
federalism.  Where they are mistaken is in assuming that distinctive-
ness and identity must be based on states as states.  States may not be 
cohesive communities.  They may not have coherent identities.  Intra-
state federalism suggests, however, that a different kind of distinc-
tiveness or identity may be at play.  In other words, federalism’s en-
during significance may not necessarily be tied to protecting states as 
such.  Rather, in many instances, federalism is the forum through 
which distinctive communities within states negotiate their relative 
political standing, and the means by which the contested identities of 
states are worked out. 
A.  State- and National-based Theories of Federalism 
Two bodies of theory dominate the federalism literature.  And like 
the federal system that they describe, these theories are aligned along 
the federal-state divide.  On the one hand, state-based theories of 
federalism emphasize the legal and political role of states.235  Under 
this view, the willingness of states to check the federal government, 
and their ability to do so under federalism doctrines, explains the 
prevalence of federalism disputes in American politics.  On the other 
hand, national-based theories see federalism disputes as an extension 
of national politics.236  The partisan split between the national politi-
cal parties, and the way states are used to advance the parties’ respec-
tive political agendas, is why federal-state contestations exist today.  
The central divide between state- and national-based theories of fed-
eralism is largely descriptive; both offer a different account of why 
federalism disputes arise.  Yet they also lead to different normative 
outlooks, especially with respect to the purpose of the federal system 
and how federalism should be structured to meet those goals.  This is 
not to say that disagreements do not exist within the camps them-
 
235 See, e.g., ELAZAR, supra note 13, at 2 (“This volume is devoted to an exploration of the way 
in which the states function as political keystones, serving their local subdivisions and 
supporting the overall structure of the national government.”); Young, supra note 13 (ex-
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236 See, e.g., SCHAPIRO, supra note 24, at 11 (“Federalism has strong support in national poli-
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selves.  Nevertheless, the most contentious battles in the federalism 
literature tend to take place across this divide. 
State-based theories draw upon federalism’s historic origins.  
Their central claim is that the basic conditions that gave rise to the 
federal system persist today.237  States, they argue, continue to be dis-
tinctive communities, each with particular needs and divergent inter-
ests.  The political identities of Americans, they assert, also remain 
split between the nation and the state.  As a result, federal-state con-
tests can often be understood as a competition for their affection.238  
From this perspective, federalism is the means by which our political 
system accommodates the geographic divides that fracture American 
society, and the contested loyalties that fragment the American polity.  
And federalism serves this role by preserving the ability of states to 
check federal power, enact policies tailored to their specific contexts, 
and compete with one another through policy experiments and in-
novations.  To be sure, we may no longer believe that federalism ar-
guments justify state-by-state divergences on such issues as slavery or 
Jim Crow.239  Yet state-based theories maintain that allowing policy 
patchworks on a number of other policy controversies is nevertheless 
worthwhile, if not outright desirable.  In short, state-based theories 
see the salience of states as the primary reason for adhering to a fed-
eral system.  The fact that federalism disputes continue to dominate 
American politics, they maintain, supports their claim about the con-
tinued relevance of states. 
In contrast, national-based theories believe that a new era of fed-
eralism is upon us.  Federalism’s historic roots may be grounded in 
the need to accommodate the distinctive culture and divergent inter-
ests of different states.  But states today, proponents of national-based 
theories point out, are simply too alike: they are integrated into a na-
tional economy; their residents are beholden to a national culture; 
and if political divides exist, they tend to be slight variations of the 
one that divides the nation as a whole.240  In place of geographic dis-
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tinctiveness and subnational identity, national-based theories posit 
that the role of federalism today is tied primarily to national poli-
tics.241  Partisan competition explains why federal-state contestation 
persists.  State politics are now largely extensions of national political 
agendas.242  To the extent that states continue to challenge the federal 
government, it is because national political parties use them as stag-
ing grounds to challenge the party in control.243  To the extent that 
states pursue policies different from those of the national govern-
ment, they do so largely in order to advance political agendas that as-
pire to become national policies.  What we are left with is often a pic-
ture that focuses on differences at the individual level—better 
reflected by ideology and partisan affiliations than geographic com-
munities. 
But if federalism is no longer about knitting together the varie-
gated communities and fractured identities in American society, then 
is it still “federalism?”  It is on precisely these grounds that Malcolm 
Feeley and Edward Rubin argue that federalism no longer exists in 
the United States.244  And while their own theory of federalism may be 
critiqued for being too narrowly drawn, it does raise the question of 
whether national-based theories of federalism truly capture why fed-
eralism matters—and seems to matter so much—to most Americans.  
People seem drawn to federalism arguments in ways that are not fully 
captured by partisan politics.  People seem attached to our federal 
system in more expansive ways than simply as a mechanism for main-
taining a separation of powers or a system of checks and balances.  
Indeed, federalism arguments seem to retain a normative appeal 
closer to its historical purpose: as a means of negotiating geographic 
divides and subnational identities.  In this respect, modern theories 
of federalism trade the descriptive problem for a normative one.  
They explain why federal-state contestation occurs.  But they offer an 
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unsatisfactory account of why it often incites such strong passions and 
continues to hold such a privileged position in American politics. 
In recent years, some federalism scholars have tried to bridge this 
divide.  Yet efforts to do so seem increasingly divorced from reality on 
the ground.  Jessica Bulman-Pozen, for example, argues that partisan-
ship can explain why state identities might still matter; people identi-
fy with states that share their partisan affiliations.245  Thus, Republi-
cans feel an affinity to Texas because it is controlled by their political 
party.  Democrats in Texas may not feel the same, but the federal sys-
tem provides them with an opportunity to form political identities 
with other states.  Similarly, Jacob Levy offers a model of state identity 
that is independent of state distinctiveness.246  The key, he suggests, is 
to see state political identities as ascriptive rather than elective.  In 
other words, Americans identify with their state not because they 
choose to; rather, they do so simply because many never leave the 
state in which they are born or spend most of their lives, and that 
“stickiness” serves as a basis for attachment and loyalties.  But are 
Americans really forming cross-state identities as Bulman-Pozen’s 
theory would suggest?  Do people feel attached to their states simply 
because it is so hard to leave, as Levy argues?  Democrats in Texas 
may look fondly upon policies in New York.  But I doubt that many 
identify in any meaningful way as New Yorkers, no matter how strong 
the partisan connection might be.  At the same time, while it is true 
that most people do not frequently move from state to state, it is not 
clear that such ascriptive identities truly spur the kind of loyalties and 
affection that motivate people to stand behind their state in opposi-
tion to their country. 
Maybe the need to locate federalism in the territorial distinctive-
ness and political identity of states is simply outdated or mistaken.  
Many proponents of national-based theories of federalism seem to 
think so.  States may simply be a historic remnant.  The invocation of 
federalism in American politics may be a national neurosis.247  Or 
maybe all the purported commitment to geographic distinctiveness 
and subnational identities is merely political cover—a disingenuous 
commitment used to mask our instrumental support of certain policy 
outcomes over others.  If any or all of these are true, then it certainly 
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Oct. 2016] INTRASTATE FEDERALISM 251 
 
lends support to Feeley and Rubin’s argument that the federal system 
in America is, at heart, no longer “federalism” at all.  Or maybe the 
problem stems from the fact that federalism scholars assume that a 
theory of federalism based on distinctiveness must revolve around the 
distinctiveness of states. 
B.  The Local as the Site of Distinctiveness and Identity 
Intrastate federalism does not resolve the underlying tension be-
tween state- and national-based theories of federalism.  Nevertheless, 
it does offer a different way to think about the terms of the debate.  
Geographic distinctiveness and subnational identities may still be 
playing a role in federalism controversies.  But it may be that the dis-
tinctiveness and identity that people care about in many federalism 
disputes are not those of states at all.  The locality is increasingly the 
scale at which geographic distinctiveness is most pronounced, and 
where claims about the need for tailoring and experimentation can 
be most strongly made.  Localities are also important sources of polit-
ical identification, especially when people feel disconnected from 
state and national politics.  Federalism, from this perspective, is use-
ful not only because localities sometimes find themselves in federal-
ism disputes when they seek state or federal support for local policies.  
Its appeal may also lie in the fact that federalism arguments are so 
closely aligned with the competing localism claims that underlie most 
intrastate conflicts. 
Both state- and national-based theories of federalism assume that 
the distinctiveness that matters is that associated with states.  But the 
kind of distinctiveness that federalism scholars often look for fits 
much better at the local scale.  Localities today often represent socio-
cultural communities in ways that states do not.  They map America’s 
partisan cleavages more accurately than the red-state, blue-state di-
vide.  More importantly, the characteristics that divide localities tend 
to be those that people care most about.  Ernest Young is right to 
point out that states still vary in a number of ways: territorial size, 
population count, and population density.248  Yet all of this pales in 
comparison to the racial, class, and cultural cleavages that so often 
describe intrastate divides at the local level.249  None of this is to say 
that localities perfectly track the heterogeneity of American society.  
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Indeed, divides within localities—between boroughs, wards, and 
neighborhoods—can sometimes be just as pronounced as those that 
separate one locality from the next.  But if federalism is a political 
strategy for reconciling geographic divides, no level of government in 
our federal system comes closer to approximating its finer grains than 
those at the local level. 
Just as geographic distinctiveness is tied to the fragmentation of 
localities at the local level, localities are also a potent source of politi-
cal identification.  Federalism scholars fixate on the identity of states 
because it is imagined that the political salience of states, and thus 
the need for a federalist arrangement, is tied in large part to the loy-
alties and affection that states generate among their residents.  But 
for most Americans, state and national affiliations also compete with 
those at the local level.  People “♥” New York;250 they “love L.A.”251  
And local attachments are not just associated with major cities; re-
searchers find equally strong attachments in both suburban and rural 
towns.252  This should not be surprising.  More so than either the 
states or the nation, localities reflect the face-to-face communities in 
which people live, the economies in which they work, and the com-
munal values that define them.  Moreover, local attachments tend to 
grow when national- and state-based identities give way.  Globaliza-
tion may be undermining the salience of nation-states.  At the same 
time, intrastate divides may be undermining the extent to which a 
single state identity can capture the hearts and minds of all state resi-
dents.  But localities are fast taking their place in the construction of 
social identities.253  Rather than looking out and towards other states, 
as Bulman-Pozen suggests, it seems that Americans are looking in-
wards for a more local sense of belonging.  Austin may be the state 
capital of Texas.  But its residents foster a political and cultural iden-
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253 See, e.g., Roland Robertson, Glocalization: Time-Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity,  in 
GLOBAL MODERNITIES 25, 35 (Mike Feathersone et al. eds., 1995) (describing how locali-
ties absorb global “cultural messages” in different ways). 
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tity that is specifically distinguished from, if not outright in opposi-
tion to, that of the state.254 
Indeed, local attachments may not just be supplanting our identi-
fication with the nation or the states.  They may also be the lenses 
through which our sense of the nation and the state are constructed.  
In discussing the emergence of the nation-state as a conceptual 
framework, Benedict Anderson famously described them as “imagined 
[political communities] because the members of even the smallest 
nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or 
even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their 
communion.”255  Given the size of the states in America, state identi-
ties are likely no less “imagined” in Anderson’s formulation.  From 
this perspective, the identity of states seems to be a function of the lo-
cal perspective from which we are looking.256  For those living in Hol-
lywood and West Los Angeles, California is the entertainment capital 
of the world, where everyone is writing a script and auditioning on 
the side.257  From the perspective of the Silicon Valley and San Fran-
cisco, it is the center of the nation’s Internet economy, where start-
ups and tech giants compete.  From the Central Valley, however, Cali-
fornia is America’s agricultural breadbasket.  And from East Los An-
geles and the San Gabriel Valley, one might see California as “a capi-
tal of the third world,” where the promise and perils of immigration 
are playing out.258  Of course, California is all of these things.  If Cali-
fornia’s political identity is confused and contested, it is because it is 
based on myriad local identities, each of which lay claim to being the 
real California. 
From this perspective, it may not be surprising that the Supreme 
Court’s first “federalism revival” in the 1970s coincided with the rise 
of “local autonomy” in constitutional jurisprudence.259  Indeed, at the 
 
254 See generally JOSHUA LONG, WEIRD CITY: SENSE OF PLACE AND CREATIVE RESISTANCE IN 
AUSTIN, TEXAS (2010) (describing the “Keep Austin Weird” movement and Austin’s 
unique character among Texas municipalities). 
255 BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD 
OF NATIONALISM 6 (2006). 
256 Cf. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 35 
(1983) (arguing that larger political communities are best understood through compari-
sons to smaller associations). 
257 See DAVID RIEFF, LOS ANGELES: CAPITAL OF THE THIRD WORLD 171 (1991) (describing the 
perception in the Westside of Los Angeles that “[e]veryone in L.A. is writing a script”). 
258 See generally id. (discussing the large concentration of various ethnic communities present 
in Los Angeles). 
259 See Williams, supra note 214,  at 118–20 (discussing the influence of the principle of local 
sovereignty on Supreme Court cases alleging discrimination in housing and schools in 
the 1970s). 
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same time it was dismantling barriers to interstate mobility by ex-
panding the constitutional “right to travel,”260 the Court was bolster-
ing municipal boundaries as a barrier to intrastate mobility.261  Nor 
should it be surprising that when the Supreme Court refocused its ef-
forts on reaffirming federalism as a restraint on federal power during 
this time, its efforts were so closely tied to a defense of local autono-
my.  As we saw earlier, the invocation of federalism principles in cases 
like San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez and Milliken v. Bradley was 
primarily in the service of protecting specific local communities—
namely, middle- and upper-class white suburbs—from constitutional 
claims made by Blacks and others living in other communities.262  
Taken together, it is telling that federalism was used to protect the 
boundaries of localities at the same time the Court was willing to em-
phasize national cohesion in undermining the ability of states to re-
strict interstate mobility.  Federalism may continue to be tied to the 
perceived need in our nation to accommodate and reconcile geo-
graphic differences and subnational identities.  It is just that, as dis-
tinctiveness and identities are increasingly associated with intrastate 
divides, the focus of federalism turns local as well. 
Federalism scholars have struggled to reconcile intrastate distinc-
tiveness and local political identities with theories that revolve around 
the distinctiveness and identities of states.  But intrastate federalism 
suggests that the relation between the two may not necessarily be op-
positional, as many federalism scholars seem to assume.  In many in-
stances, federalism fights are about the geographic divides that frag-
ment American society.  Demands for tailored policymaking, local 
autonomy, and the ability to experiment and innovate may be seri-
ously made, and not simply a cover for the substantive policy at hand.  
But the stakes of the debate may not be about the distinctiveness or 
identities of states per se.  Rather, they may have much more to do 
with people’s attachments to the policies and interests of their local 
 
260 See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 254 (1974) (noting the recogni-
tion of interstate travel as a fundamental constitutional right); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 
U.S. 330, 338 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629–31 (1969) (holding that a 
law intended to inhibit the migration of poor people into a state was unconstitutional be-
cause it violated the constitutionally guaranteed right to travel).  But see Sosna v. Iowa, 419 
U.S. 393, 404–06 (1975) (upholding a durational residency requirement justified under 
Iowa’s “comprehensive statutory regulation of domestic relations”). 
261 See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (upholding 
the denial of rezoning land to federally subsidized housing); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 
490 (1975); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding an ordinance 
prohibiting unmarried couples from living together). 
262 See supra notes 211–26 and accompanying text. 
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communities.  For some, these align with the state.  For others, their 
interests align with the federal government.  Different communities 
may find themselves in disagreement over which of their policies 
should prevail.  But both sides may be in agreement over federalism 
as a framework because it gives voice to arguments grounded in terri-
torial distinctiveness and subnational identity. 
C.  Federalism and the Contested State 
I have suggested that local distinctiveness and local identities may 
play a more significant role in federalism disputes than prevailing 
federalism theories acknowledge.  Another way of looking at distinc-
tiveness and identity through an intrastate lens is to expand the man-
ner in which they are used to describe states.  Federalism scholars 
may be right to believe that what matters is how states continue to be 
differentiated from one another.  Yet they too readily assume that this 
differentiation must be based on something that unites a state to-
gether.  A state may be internally divided.  Its identity may be fiercely 
contested.  Yet the particular manner in which it is political divided, 
and the specific ways in which its identity is contested, may be what 
truly defines the social and political distinctiveness of a particular 
state.  To be sure, describing states in this manner does not lend easi-
ly to the traditional argument that federalism serves to knit together 
variegated, but otherwise internally homogenous, communities into a 
political union.  But, as I suggest here, it may help to explain why 
federalism disputes often involve states that are internally divided and 
undergoing tremendous demographic change. 
In talking about a state’s social and political culture, jurists and 
legal commentators tend to focus on broad generalizations of what 
makes a state unique.  In defining the source of this uniqueness, 
however, there is surprisingly little effort to probe into the internal 
dynamics that truly define the politics and culture of a particular 
state.  States may be internally divided, but they are nevertheless di-
vided in different ways.  It is impossible to describe politics in a state 
like New Jersey without accounting for the divide between its two ma-
jor metropolitan areas—those associated with New York City in the 
north and Philadelphia in the south—and the stark racial divide be-
tween cities like Camden and Newark and the white suburbs that sur-
round them.263  Similarly, one cannot fully understand Florida politics 
 
263 See DENNIS E. GALE, GREATER NEW JERSEY: LIVING IN THE SHADOW OF GOTHAM 82–85 
(2006) (noting that the news broadcast networks and newspapers in New Jersey are pre-
dominantly from either New York City or Philadelphia). 
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without recognizing the impact of immigration—both foreign and 
domestic—on the state’s demographic transformation, and the split it 
has created between communities in the southern and northern parts 
of the state.264  Few would mistake New Jersey for Florida, or assume 
that the politics or culture in either state is the same.  But what sets 
them apart is in many ways a reflection of the particular manner in 
which they are divided. 
What makes states unique may also lie in the specific ways that 
state identities are contested.  In debates about whether people 
meaningfully identify with their state, federalism scholars often clash 
over what the identity of a state might be.  The fact that a state may 
foster competing identities is usually taken to be evidence that people 
do not, perhaps cannot, meaningfully identify with their state.  But it 
may be precisely when state identities are in flux that the very idea of 
a unique state identity becomes the most salient in state and national 
politics.  Some have argued that it is often when national identities 
are contested that efforts to define such an identity are the most in-
tense.265  It may be that the salience of state identities follows a similar 
logic.  Efforts to construct a “southern identity” peaked precisely 
when economic development, rapid urbanization, and the civil rights 
movement began to offer alternative visions in the southern states.266  
Several generations earlier, leaders in northern states like New York 
and Massachusetts similarly struggled to locate an intrinsic state iden-
tity when massive immigration was making it more difficult to pin 
down what that identity might be.267 
There is no reason to assume that divided states with contested 
identities lack distinctiveness or are incapable of generating loyalty 
and affection among their residents.  Indeed, if the purpose of draw-
ing out the distinctiveness and identity of states is to explain why fed-
eral-state contestation occurs, a theory of states that focuses on inter-
nal divisions and contested identities may ultimately be more useful.  
Federalism battles are not limited to states like Wyoming, Idaho, or 
 
264 See GIMPEL & SCHUKNECHT, supra note 25, at 86–93 (comparing the political divide in 
Florida counties with the ethnic populations in those counties). 
265 See PAUL ROE, ETHNIC VIOLENCE AND THE SOCIETAL SECURITY DILEMMA 59–60 (2005). 
266 See JAMES C. COBB, AWAY DOWN SOUTH: A HISTORY OF SOUTHERN IDENTITY 231 (2005) 
(noting the effort to maintain a “permanent and immutable” Southern culture as society 
and the region changed). 
267 See PAUL M. SEARLS, TWO VERMONTS: GEOGRAPHY AND IDENTITY, 1865–1910 60, 136 
(2006) (discussing the evolving role of immigrants and the issues of prohibition in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Vermont); Bluford Adams, New Ireland: 
The Place of Immigrants in American Regionalism, 24 J. AM. ETHN. HIST. 3, 3–4 (2005) (noting 
the impact of immigrants on regionalism). 
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North Dakota where internal divisions are less pronounced, as tradi-
tional federalism theories might predict.  Rather, they are often more 
likely to involve diverse and divided states like New York, California, 
Texas, and increasingly Colorado, Arizona, and Virginia.  Moreover, 
the timing of these disputes also seems to correspond with when the-
se states are undergoing the most dramatic demographic change, and 
state identities are contested and in flux.  California challenged fed-
eral immigration laws with its enactment of Proposition 187 in 1994, 
precisely the time when the state tipped from being a white and Re-
publican-controlled state to one in which minorities are in the major-
ity and Democrats solidly in control.268  Arizona did the same with S.B. 
1070 in 2010, also a time when demographic shifts were marking a 
transition from an “old” Arizona to a “new.”269  And just as California 
withdrew its support for Proposition 187 in the years following its en-
actment, Arizona appears to be distancing itself as well.  Russell 
Pierce, the state senator who introduced S.B. 1070, was successfully 
recalled a year after the law was enacted, and the current governor 
seems distinctly uninterested in associating himself with the state’s 
controversial law.270 
Given the costs and benefits of federalism disputes, it may not be 
surprising that contested states so often find themselves at the fore-
front of federalism controversies.  Federalism depends on states be-
ing willing to stand up to check the federal government.  But doing 
so is costly.  Federalism challenges drain state coffers; they expend 
political capital.  State-based theories of federalism assume that the 
states willing to pay these costs are those with distinct cultures and 
cohesive identities mounting a defense against external forces.  Intra-
state federalism suggests, however, that the states may also be willing 
to pay this price when political control is most contested.  Virginia 
was nominally controlled by Republicans when it sued the federal 
government in an effort to gut President Obama’s Affordable Care 
Act in 2010.  Yet the Republican grip on the state was tenuous, and 
many saw this as an effort by the party to mobilize its voters in the 
face of the state’s political change.  Indeed, the lawsuit was perceived 
 
268 See LISA BEDOLLA, FLUID BORDERS: LATINO POWER, IDENTITY, AND POLITICS IN LOS 
ANGELES 29–30 (2005). 
269 See Eric Jay Toll, Old, New Arizona in Crossfire on Fifth Anniversary of SB 1070, PHX. BUS. J. 
(Apr. 24, 2015), http://www.bizjournals.com/phoenix/blog/business/2015/04/old-new-
arizona-in-crossfire-on-fifth-anniversary.html (describing the public perception of the ma-
jor players five years after the controversial immigration bill S.B. 1070 in Arizona). 
270 See Howard Fischer, Ducey Leaves Any Appeal on “Dreamers” Up to the New AG, ARIZ. DAILY 
STAR, Jan. 31, 2015, at C1 (showing how the new Arizona governor has attempted to dis-
tance himself from the controversial immigration law). 
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by many political veterans in Virginia as the latest in a string of devel-
opments reshaping a state political culture that was once known for 
its civility and conciliation. And the impetus for these actions was tied 
to the fact that Virginia now finds itself more evenly divided than ever 
on a political level.271 
Just as federalism depends on states’ willingness to challenge the 
federal government, it is also contingent on the federal government’s 
willingness to assert authority against a state.  This side of the federal-
ism equation is often overlooked.  But the fiscal and political costs 
borne by states in federalism disputes weigh on the federal govern-
ment as well.  State-based theories of federalism assume that the fed-
eral government is most likely to confront states whose political and 
cultural norms are the most out-of-step with the nation as a whole.  
Intrastate federalism suggests, however, that the federal government 
might be equally, if not more, willing to intervene in states where in-
ternal discord is the most pronounced.  Federal intervention during 
the civil rights era targeted those states in which local tensions were 
high and especially volatile.  The federal government sued Arizona 
over its immigration law in 2010 after fierce protests against the law 
had broken out all across the state, but largely ignored Missouri and 
Oklahoma, which had passed similar laws earlier but without the 
same degree of intrastate tensions.  In choosing which state the fed-
eral government should expend its resources and political capital to 
challenge, federal actors seem just as motivated by intrastate divisions 
as the states themselves. 
In short, looking at distinctiveness and identity through this per-
spective not only accounts for the types of states that tend to get em-
broiled in federalism disputes.  It also offers a way of reconciling the 
divide in the federalism literature between state- and national-based 
theories of federalism.  On the one hand, intrastate federalism sug-
gests that state-based theories are right to emphasize the distinctive-
ness and identity of states in explaining federal-state contestation.  
The fact that political divides exists within states, or that a state’s po-
litical identity may appear contested, explains why both the federal 
government and the states find themselves locked in a federalism 
 
271 See Trip Gabriel, In Politics, the “Virginia Way” No Longer Reflects Its Genial Southern Roots, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/28/us/politics/in-virginia-
bob-mcdonnells-corruption-trial-symbolizes-growing-political-partisanship.html (“The 
more closely divided a political environment, the nastier the disputes are.  Because [Vir-
ginia] is basically 50-50, all parties are engaged in the kind of trench warfare that really is 
a very, very distinct departure from the dynamic that previously marked state government 
here.”). 
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dispute.  On the other hand, intrastate federalism also supports na-
tional-based theories of federalism and their focus on national poli-
tics.  The states that tend to get embroiled in federalism disputes also 
tend to be those that are internally divided in much the same way as 
the nation as a whole.  Federalism disputes are framed around feder-
al-state contestation.  But the substantive issues at stake in many fed-
eralism disputes are those that divide both the nation and the states 
involved. 
IV.  INTRASTATE FEDERALISM AND THE DIVIDE WITHIN STATES 
It is easy from the foregoing analysis to assume that the most sig-
nificant implication of intrastate federalism is with respect to federal-
ism.  But equally important is what it tells us about how federalism 
disputes are being used to shape the nature and consequences of 
America’s intrastate divides.  In other words, how has intrastate fed-
eralism shaped our national response to local problems stemming 
from the divide within states and between localities? 
This is not an insignificant issue.  Many of the problems that 
America faces today—from race relations to economic inequality—
are rooted in the fragmentation of our local communities.  At the 
same time, few solutions to these problems seem possible without ad-
dressing how local boundaries fracture American society and delimit 
the bounds of our communal obligations.  The organization of our 
local communities, and the impact of this organization on American 
society, is seldom mentioned in debates about federalism and the 
federal-state relationship upon which it is traditionally based.  Yet in 
making federalism decisions, we are often making important deci-
sions on how our local communities are organized, and the impact of 
this organization on American society.  Intrastate conflicts may be re-
shaping the role of federalism in American politics.  But the corollary 
is that federalism is also shaping the role of intrastate fragmentation 
in American society. 
Yet despite the importance of intrastate conflicts, the rise of intra-
state federalism may hamper our efforts to address them.  To be sure, 
reframing an interlocal conflict as a federal-state dispute allows local 
political actors to raise issues that may otherwise be ignored.  But this 
reframing often conceals and distorts the nature of the intrastate 
conflicts at stake.  Concealment and distortion is not just a problem 
for courts and policymakers who eventually confront interlocal con-
flicts as federalism controversies.  It may also alter how local political 
actors themselves see these problems, and the way they go about ad-
dressing them.  Negotiating intrastate divides may not the be purpose 
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for which our federal system was designed.  But if that is the way it is 
now commonly used, it is worth asking whether it can serve this role 
in a more meaningful capacity. 
A.  The Significance of Intrastate Fragmentation 
National and state politics dominate discussions about federalism.  
Yet the issues that shape national and state politics are also increas-
ingly the result of how intrastate divisions are geographically orga-
nized.  Racial and economic inequality is a product of the spatially 
segregated communities that determine access to good jobs, safe 
neighborhoods, and meaningful educational opportunities.272   Amer-
ica’s social and cultural rifts are exacerbated by local geographic 
boundaries that limit the everyday interactions that we might other-
wise have with people who think differently than ourselves.273  Skepti-
cism about the role of government today is also shaped by the re-
sponsiveness of our local governments and their ability to address 
local concerns.274  In short, the crisis in American politics today is not 
simply a product of ideology or partisanship.  It is also a result of 
deepening interlocal divides, and the dire consequences of organiz-
ing American society in this manner. 
It is here that we have to recognize that the intrastate fragmenta-
tion that I have described is not just a social or economic phenome-
non.  It is also the product of laws and policies that have contributed 
to, and incentivized, the sorting of Americans into discrete legal ju-
risdictions.  And the consequences of this fragmentation is profound.  
It is part of the reason why more than half a century after racial seg-
regation was declared unconstitutional, America remains as segregat-
ed as ever.  The fragmentation of local land use powers, along with 
the ability to use local boundaries to insulate services and tax bases 
from outsiders, have concerted to sort Americans into localities on 
the basis of race and class.275  It also helps explain the low level of 
economic mobility that new generations of Americans face, as wealth 
 
272 See PATRICK SHARKEY, STUCK IN PLACE: URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE END OF 
PROGRESS TOWARD RACIAL EQUALITY 60–62 (2013) (noting that economic segregation 
through local zoning ordinances leads to racially segregated neighborhoods). 
273 See BISHOP & CUSHING, supra note 30, at 287 (noting the difference in political views be-
tween two counties in Colorado). 
274 Cf. ELAINE B. SHARP, DOES LOCAL GOVERNMENT MATTER?  HOW URBAN POLICIES SHAPE 
CIVIC ENGAGEMENT 19 (2012) (examining policy-centered theory in the context of local 
and urban government). 
275 See GORDON, supra note 192, at 9–10 (noting the shift of resources and political power 
from cities to suburbs through the segregating effects of local land use controls). 
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and income disparities are replicated across different communities in 
the quality of schools, safety of neighborhoods, and the availability of 
jobs.276  The manner in which inequality is spatially organized in 
American society means that many people are foreclosed from ac-
quiring the kind of human, social, and economic capital to move 
from one socioeconomic stratum to the next.277  Indeed, from hous-
ing to education to healthcare, there are few issues facing America 
today that are not due in part—and often a substantial part—to the 
high degree of segregation and fragmentation at the local level. 
It might strike some as trivial to think about federalism through 
such an overtly local lens.  When we talk about federalism, we tend to 
think big.  Federalism, after all, is the political structure around 
which the United States is organized.  Its design preoccupied our na-
tion’s founders, and fiercely divided them in the early years of the re-
public.278  And since then, it has continuously been invoked in some 
of the most contentious battles in American life, including those that 
have threatened the integrity and viability of the union that it was 
created to maintain.279  From this perspective, the most striking aspect 
of the rise of intrastate federalism is the extent to which federalism is 
increasingly being used to negotiate interlocal conflicts, which ap-
pears to be far  from its original purpose. 
But if we foreground intrastate fragmentation as a meaningful 
problem—both from a local and national perspective—then the most 
important lesson of intrastate federalism may be that the cause and 
consequences of interlocal divisions are increasingly resolved through 
debates about federalism and the federal-state relationship.  We saw 
this with respect to immigration in Arizona; by soliciting the aid of 
both the federal government and the state, competing localities en-
gineered a federalism controversy that ultimately decided which local 
policies would prevail and which would be overturned.  This was also 
the case in Massachusetts, where Boston’s efforts to shore up its em-
ployment prospects in the face of suburban flight rested on the pe-
 
276 See Raj Chetty & Nathaniel Hendren, The Impacts of Neighborhoods on 
Intergenerational Mobility: Childhood Exposure Effects and County-Level Estimates (May 
2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Harvard University) (studying the negative 
effects of low-income and segregated neighborhoods on children). 
277 See Ford, supra note 209, at 1851–52 (noting that much of the racial segregation in cities 
and suburban life is correlated to economic segregation of the races). 
278 See generally STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM: THE EARLY 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1788–1800 22–29 (1994) (discussing the different beliefs held by the 
Founding Fathers about the role of the federal government). 
279 See RYAN, supra note 11, at 75–76 (noting the challenge to federalism brought on by the 
Civil War). 
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ripheral impact that the policy had on out-of-state workers and inter-
state relations.  Even political movements based on federalism have 
shaped the relationship between different localities in profound ways.  
As we saw, the “New Federalism” revolution in the latter half of the 
twentieth century did as much to shape urban-suburban relations as 
those involving the federal government and the states.  Time and 
time again, federalism has been at the forefront of how interlocal 
conflicts have been resolved. 
But federalism has done more than simply determine winners and 
losers at the local level.  In many cases, it has also shaped the very 
structure of intrastate fragmentation that gives rise to intrastate fed-
eralism disputes in the first place.  Federalism was not only invoked 
by the Supreme Court in Rodriguez and Milliken to insulate privileged 
suburban school districts against equal protection claims made by its 
less fortunate neighbors.  It also contributed to holdings that rein-
forced the significance of municipal boundaries, making it all the 
more likely that those wishing to avoid racial integration or wealth 
redistribution would seek the protection that those boundaries could 
now provide.280  The federalism battles over the role of the federal 
government in local affairs, and whether federal funds should be dis-
tributed directly through localities or through the state, have also 
changed how we think about local finances.  As a result, federalism 
became a more convenient framework for working out interlocal in-
equities than regional solutions involving direct negotiations between 
localities.  In other words, the way by which federalism has been de-
ployed to resolve intrastate conflicts has also contributed to the local 
divides that have made intrastate federalism more common. 
Indeed, foregrounding federalism in this manner is all the more 
necessary as traditional forums for resolving interlocal disputes are 
waning.  While states today are more inclined than ever to exert pow-
er and control over their localities, state politics itself is increasingly 
less focused on shrinking interlocal divisions or negotiating interlocal 
tensions.  Rather than a forum in which localities can represent and 
reconcile their differences, states tend to treat localities as isolated 
units without much regard for the relations between them.  State 
courts in the late twentieth century briefly emerged as a useful venue 
for addressing interlocal disparities, especially with respect to racial 
and economic segregation in housing and schools.281   But without the 
 
280 See Ford, supra note 209, at 1875–77 (discussing the impacts of the Milliken and Rodriguez 
cases). 
281 See, e.g., Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1354 (N.H. 1997) (holding that 
New Hampshire’s system for financing elementary and secondary public education was 
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support of governors or state legislators, their efforts have produced 
soaring rhetoric but limited results.  And while the federal govern-
ment still occasionally turns its attention towards local matters like 
policing and education, recent efforts have largely abandoned the 
regional outlook that guided federal policies in the past.282  In mod-
ern political times, it would seem, local political actors have no choice 
but to navigate interlocal disputes around the federal system in 
search of supporters.  And interlocal conflicts are successfully framed 
as such only when competing local actors are able to recruit allies at 
different governmental levels to fight on their behalf. 
The hidden role that federalism has played in shaping the nature 
and consequences of America’s intrastate divides is not just some-
thing that federalism scholars have largely overlooked.  It is also a 
point that local government scholars do not seem to fully appreciate.  
This is not to say that local government scholars have not at times 
considered how federalism affects a locality’s power and authority, 
especially vis-à-vis their states.283  Rather, it is that they often overlook 
how the very structure of federalism disputes itself replicates the lo-
cal-local and state-local battles that local government research is so 
focused on. 
B.  Federalism as a Forum for Interlocal Negotiations 
But if federalism is now an important forum for interlocal negoti-
ations, how well does it actually serve in this capacity?  In my view, 
federalism’s prospects in this regard are mixed.  On the one hand, 
federalism provides a much needed forum for competing localities to 
voice and resolve their grievances.  On the other hand, federalism of-
ten conceals the underlying nature of the problems involved, espe-
cially the intrastate dimensions that define these disputes.  The na-
ture and consequence of intrastate fragmentation may be shaped by 
how federalism decisions are made.  Yet, because of the manner in 
 
unconstitutional); So. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 
390 (N.J. 1983) (concerning a requirement that municipalities in New Jersey “provide a 
realistic opportunity for low and moderate income housing”); Edgewood Indep. Sch. 
Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989) (challenging the constitutionality of Texas’s 
system for financing public schools). 
282 See GERALD BENJAMIN & RICHARD P NATHAN, REGIONALISM AND REALISM: A STUDY OF 
GOVERNMENTS IN THE NEW YORK METROPOLITAN AREA 267 (2001) (noting that while 
states principally make regional decisions, the national government may still offer finan-
cial aid to enforce regionalism). 
283 See generally Davidson, supra note 78; Hills, supra note 78. 
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which federalism is addressed, we often do so without a clear under-
standing of the local stakes involved. 
To be sure, intrastate federalism is an adaptation that has helped 
elevate many local concerns onto the national stage.  Localities may 
have lost much in terms of their formal role in American politics.  Yet 
intrastate federalism suggests that they have found ways to exert in-
fluence indirectly by recruiting proxies at the state and federal level.  
This is made possible by the flexibility of our federal system, and the 
fact that federalism arguments about centralization and decentraliza-
tion apply just as well to local efforts to resist state authority as they 
do to state efforts to resist federal control.  It is also a testament to the 
persistence and ingenuity of local political actors, and their ability to 
foster relationships and navigate the federal system.  This is all the 
more important because federalism draws attention in ways that local-
ism does not.  For example, not much attention was given to the op-
position of rural counties in western Colorado to the state’s legaliza-
tion of marijuana when it was framed as an intrastate dispute.  That 
changed, however, when local sheriffs joined their counterparts in 
Oklahoma and Nebraska in filing a suit against Colorado alleging 
that the legalization forces them to violate their allegiance to federal 
law and also imposes costs on neighboring states.284  As David Barron 
has argued, there is no reason to believe that local governments are 
necessarily tied to any particular side of the federal-state divide.285  
Given the inferior status of localities vis-à-vis both the federal gov-
ernment and the state, local interests are often as well served by an 
expansive construction of federal power as they are by a broad recog-
nition of state rights.  What intrastate federalism demonstrates is that 
this logic is already well recognized in the politics of federalism, and 
has already shaped the purpose to which federalism disputes are 
used. 
But even if federalism brings the relevance and significance of 
many intrastate conflicts to light, there are limits to its role as a forum 
for negotiating intrastate conflict.  The first problem is concealment. 
Local political actors may look to federalism as a means of advancing 
local interests and negotiating intrastate divides.  Yet successfully re-
 
284 See Kirk Mitchell and John Ingold, Recreational Marijuana: Colorado Sheriffs Challenge 
Amendment 64, DENV. POST (June 8, 2016) http://www.denverpost.com/ 2015/03/05/
recreational-marijuana-colorado-sheriffs-challenge-amendment-64/ (discussing the law-
suit filed by Sheriffs against their governor in response to the legalization of marijuana in 
Colorado). 
285 See David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DUKE LAW J. 377, 379–80 
(2001) (noting the paradox that the central government both protects and limits local 
autonomy). 
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framing an intrastate conflict as a federalism dispute often obscures 
the local interests involved.  This concealment affects how intrastate 
federal disputes are resolved.  It shapes how court decisions and polit-
ical resolutions are reported.  Moreover, it affects how intrastate fed-
eralism disputes are remembered.  The intrastate conflicts that 
prompted the federalism battle over Arizona’s controversial immigra-
tion law in 2010, for example, were well documented in court filings, 
open letters, and local media accounts.  Yet few people at the time or 
today saw this as anything other than a classic federal-state fight.  Sim-
ilarly, when New York joined Cortland and Alleghany Counties in 
their suit against the federal scheme for disposing of low-level radio-
active waste, it was widely acknowledged that New York was doing an 
about-face and that the local plaintiffs in the suit were part of the rea-
son.  Yet few remember these details today in talking about the land-
mark federalism decision that this challenge produced.  As a means 
of resolving intrastate conflicts, federalism may indeed by a useful 
framework.  But as a forum for gauging the competing local interests 
that lead to intrastate conflicts, federalism seems to conceal more 
than it exposes. 
Another problem with intrastate federalism is distortion.  Indeed, 
even when local interests are raised in the federalism context, they 
tend to be framed in such a way so that the interlocal nature of the 
dispute, and the complex relationship between states and localities, 
are taken out of the analysis.  Traditional federalism doctrine does 
not formally account for the local sphere.  But when it does, it tends 
to treat local interests as synonymous with that of the state, even when 
competing local interests are at play.  When federalism concerns were 
raised in educational equality cases like San Antonio Independent School 
District v. Rodriguez and Milliken v. Bradley, the Supreme Court tied 
federalism to the local autonomy of prosperous suburban communi-
ties and the interests of the state, while entirely ignoring the interests 
and autonomy of disadvantaged communities.  Similarly, when the 
Supreme Court confronted city efforts to privilege its residents at the 
expense of suburban workers in White v. Massachusetts Council of 
Construction Employers, Inc., the question of local autonomy and city-
suburb relations was subsumed entirely into a discussion about the 
ability of states to discriminate against out-of-state workers and what 
this meant for interstate relations.  All three of these cases raised 
important questions about the spatial organization of American 
society.  In none of them could it be said that elevating state control 
or federal power would advance a definitive local interest.  The Court 
could hardly be faulted for overlooking this in resolving these 
disputes; federalism doctrine operates through a federal-state lens.  
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But in priveleging one set of local interests over another, the 
resolution of these cases is often premised on a distorted view of the 
interlocal tensions at stake. 
Third, and even more troubling, however, is the effect that it has 
on how localities and their residents come to understand the nature 
of the intrastate fights that they are embroiled in.  All too often, local 
political actors seek state and federal intervention to achieve policy 
outcomes that might not otherwise be possible.  But coming to rely 
on state and federal intervention also changes the local perception of 
the underlying issue.  When local factions saw their policies over-
turned by state laws in the early twentieth century, it was easy to 
blame the states for intervening in local affairs while papering over 
the fact that the intervention often came at the behest of local forces 
who appealed to the state.286  When federal intervention became nec-
essary to advance the civil rights movement, it became possible for lo-
cal segregationists to cast the intrastate clashes over Jim Crow as a 
contest between locals and outsiders, the states against the federal 
government.287   The fact that much of the push for civil rights came 
from within the contested states themselves was wiped from the con-
ventional accounts.  In an era of intrastate federalism, it becomes eas-
ier for local political actors to cast blame for the plight of their com-
munities on state and federal policymakers.  What becomes lost is any 
sense that local policies themselves are part of the problem, and may 
be central to finding an enduring solution. 
In short, federalism is a necessary yet imperfect forum for address-
ing interlocal tensions.  It offers a framework for negotiating intra-
state conflicts.  Yet by directing the attention to the federal-state di-
vide, it can obscure the interlocal dynamics at stake. 
C.  Negotiating Intrastate Conflicts 
How might the promise of intrastate federalism be realized?  This 
is not an easy endeavor given the constitutional structure of our fed-
eral system and the incentives that it creates for political actors.  But 
for those concerned about the nature and consequences of growing 
intrastate fragmentation at the local level, this is an issue that de-
 
286 See Scott Allard, Nancy Burns & Gerald Gamm, Representing Urban Interests: The Local Poli-
tics of State Legislatures, 12 STUD. AM. POLIT. DEV. 267, 288 (1998) (noting state legislation 
assiginging appointments to a city governing board to the city council members and the 
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287 See JASON SOKOL, THERE GOES MY EVERYTHING: WHITE SOUTHERNERS IN THE AGE OF CIVIL 
RIGHTS, 1945–1975, at 69–83 (2008) (discussing the segregationist belief that the push for 
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mands attention.  What intrastate federalism teaches us is that in or-
der to balance the relationship between competing localities in an 
America fractured along municipal boundaries requires us to reex-
amine how federalism is deployed in American law and politics. 
We can begin by reassessing the legal doctrines and political ar-
guments that we use to resolve federalism disputes.  If federal-state 
conflicts are increasingly proxies for interlocal disputes, then our 
view of federalism should be expanded to account for this reality.  As 
a matter of law, we should reexamine doctrines that automatically as-
sume that federal power is tied to centralization and uniformity, or 
that the states serve the interest of tailored policymaking and exper-
imentation.  We should question the common assumption that states 
are synonymous with localities or that local interests are always best 
served by their states.  In an era of intrastate fragmentation, there is 
no singular local interest.  The goals of one locality is often at odds 
with others in the state.  None of this should be taken as an attack on 
our federal system or its role in contemporary American society.  
None of this suggests that federal-state conflicts are unimportant or 
fail to capture the realities of American politics.  Rather, these pro-
posals simply recognize that the policy positions of the federal gov-
ernment and the states are not generated in a vacuum.  In an era of 
interlocal fragmentation, they are necessarily informed by the expe-
riences and interests of competing localities.  Just as the balance of 
federal and state powers has historically been mediated through their 
relationship with America’s myriad localities, federal and state politics 
today is also increasingly an extension of the differences that divide 
our local communities. 
It is also important that we understand the interlocal nature of in-
trastate federalism disputes.  Federalism is structured around the ver-
tical competition between different levels of government.  Yet solu-
tions to interlocal conflicts ultimately require the horizontal 
negotiations between competing localities.288  Addressing the conse-
quences of America’s deepening interlocal divides, then, may lie less 
in developing forums in which competing localities can do battle.  
More important may be developing forums that can foster coopera-
tion and coordination between localities themselves.  How can we en-
courage local communities to find common interests?  How can we 
cast light on the fact that the fates of local communities are often tied 
to the policies of their neighbors?  From this perspective, federalism 
itself may be as much a problem as a solution.  It is not just that the 
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current federalism framework obscures the horizontal relationships 
between localities, and the spillover effects that local policies have on 
one another.  It also prompts local political actors to look up rather 
than out towards one another in search of common ground and ne-
gotiated solutions.  This is not to say that reframing interlocal con-
flicts as federalism disputes does not produce results.  After all, cer-
tain localities are likely to be pleased by the outcome of intrastate 
federalism disputes, whether they are resolved in court or in the 
world of legislative politics.  Yet these victories tend to be fleeting.  
They do not address the underlying structure that gives rise to these 
conflicts.  Nor do they promote the kind of environment that makes 
interlocal negotiations possible. 
In addition to reforming how federalism battles are waged, then, 
it might also be necessary to explore whether other forums for intra-
state negotiations can be opened up.  Would local political actors be 
as inclined to navigate interlocal disputes into the federalism arena if 
other avenues are available?  Would federalism disputes be more nar-
rowly reserved for true federal-state conflicts if interlocal resolutions 
can be reached through other means?  Local government scholars 
have proposed various ways through which localities might better ad-
dress the spillover effects that they have on one another.289  Many of 
these proposals hold not only a better way of resolving interlocal dis-
putes, but also the possibility of forestalling the growth of intrastate 
fragmentation in a way that makes these disputes less likely.  What in-
trastate federalism suggests is that these efforts are not only relevant 
to those interested in the plight of local communities.  It is also cen-
tral to those interested in reforming how we address federalism con-
troversies in American law and politics. 
But maybe even more important than doctrinal or institutional re-
forms may simply be the need to recognize that place still matters in 
American society.  It is easy to forget this in an era dominated by dis-
cussions about globalization and the networked society.290  It is easy to 
assume, as many federalism scholars now do, that American politics 
operates in some grand forum in which partisanship, ideology, and 
individual preferences delineate the battle lines in federalism dis-
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putes.  But Americans still live in particular places.  These places still 
determine to a great extent who we are and the lives that we can lead.  
Laws continue to demarcate these places as specific legal jurisdic-
tions.  And these jurisdictions, and the relationships between them, 
frame much of the problems that confront American society today.  
The federalism literature may be right that states may no longer be 
the geographic or legal institutions that best represent the signifi-
cance of place for most Americans.  But that hardly means that place 
and space no longer matters; it just lies within the state boundaries 
and below the state governments that preoccupies much of our atten-
tion.  From this perspective, intrastate federalism is not all that differ-
ent from federalism generally understood.  Federalism continues to 
be the mechanism by which we bind a fractured and diverse society 
into a more perfect union.  Intrastate federalism simply recognizes 
that the fault lines that we need to address today are increasingly at 
the local level and within states. 
CONCLUSION 
The divide between states is fading.  The distinctions between na-
tional and state politics are eroding.  Why then do federalism dis-
putes—structured as they are around federal-state conflict—still pre-
dominate in American politics?  In this Article, I have argued that the 
answer lies in the growing divide within states.  More than ever, 
Americans are being sorted into local communities on the basis of 
personal characteristics and shared interests.  As a result, the bound-
aries between localities increasingly represent the fault lines in Amer-
ican society.  Rather than undermining the role of federalism in 
American politics, however, I have argued that intrastate divides are 
increasingly at the root of federalism controversies.  Consequently, 
federalism is increasingly being used to negotiate intrastate conflicts. 
The rise of intrastate federalism—as I have called this develop-
ment—has many sources.  As my examination of federal-state battles 
over immigration and civil rights revealed, it is sometimes the result 
of local political actors who recruit the federal government and the 
states to do battle on their behalf.  As the discussion of marijuana pol-
icy and resident worker preferences suggested, it is also spurred by 
localities invoking or contesting federalism arguments to defend local 
policies from countervailing laws at the state and federal level.  
Moreover, as the political battles over “New Federalism” and efforts to 
regulate the disposal of low-level radioactive waste showed, federalism 
battles often serves as the means by which competing localities seek 
to alter the design and local impact of state and federal programs.  
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The fact that localities are increasingly turning to federalism, howev-
er, is not merely a product of contemporary developments.  This path 
was laid in the development of federalism more generally, particular-
ly the way that the balance of federal and state power had historically 
been mediated through the localities themselves. 
There is every reason to believe that intrastate federalism will con-
tinue to play an important role in federalism disputes in the foresee-
able future.  Indeed, all of the forces that have remade federalism in-
to a forum for intrastate conflicts are likely to persist, if not intensify.  
Even as states are becoming more alike, social and economic segrega-
tion at the local level continues to grow.  Representing increasingly 
insular enclaves, localities are likely to continue their competition at 
the forefront of controversial policy disputes.  All the while, the basic 
structure of our federal system creates strong incentives for political 
actors to navigate intrastate conflicts into the federalism arena.  Intra-
state federalism may not be the purpose for which federalism is de-
signed.  Yet it will likely continue to be a central part of federalism 
disputes for years to come. 
All of this has consequences for how we understand both the role 
of federalism in American politics and the significance of intrastate 
divisions on American society.  It is time that we broadened the fed-
eralism debate beyond its traditional focus on states as states.  It is al-
so time that we recognize that, in an era of intrastate federalism, how 
federalism controversies are resolved has consequences for more 
than federal-state relations.  Federalism is already being used to nego-
tiate America’s growing intrastate divides.  We just have to recognize 
this new role in accounting for federalism’s continued significance in 
American politics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
